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REDEPLOYMENT OF THE GERMAN BREST
GROUP THROUGH THE ENGLISH CHANNEL ,
11–13 FEBRUARY 1942 (OPER ATION CERBERUS)
Milan Vego

T

he successful operational redeployment of the German Brest Group (consisting of two battleships and one heavy cruiser) plus six destroyers from
Brest, France, to home waters from 11 to 13 February 1942 (dubbed Operation
CERBERUS) was a major defensive naval/joint operation for the Germans.1 Operation CERBERUS remains one of very few such operations aimed not at destroying
hostile forces but at carrying out an operational redeployment. Although the
British prepared an operation plan to respond, it was incoherent and executed
as a series of poorly coordinated tactical actions carried out by several major
commands. The Germans were highly successful in both planning and executing
Operation CERBERUS; while both battleships suffered some damage from enemy
mines, they eventually reached home waters. Despite the passage of time, this
operation is rich in operational lessons that are still valid today and will remain
so in the future.
The 32,600-ton (standard), thirty-one-knot
Milan Vego has been a professor in the Joint Military
German battleships (often referred to as battle
Operations Department at the Naval War College
cruisers) Scharnhorst and Gneisenau arrived at
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of Operational Art (2013) and a University Professor Brest in March 1941 after a highly successful cruise
(2017). Dr. Vego holds a PhD in European history from in the Atlantic (Operation BERLIN). The 18,750the George Washington University. The most recent of
his fourteen books are General Naval Tactics and Ex- ton (full), thirty-two-knot heavy cruiser Prinz
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Eugen joined them in June 1941, after the ill-fated
Operation R HEINÜBUNG , in which it operated
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with the battleship Bismarck.2
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The Brest Group soon became the focus of reconnaissance aircraft and heavy
bombers of Britain’s Royal Air Force (RAF). British bombers started attacking
Brest on 6 April 1941. In a night raid on 10/11 April, Gneisenau was hit with four
bombs that caused serious damage and left fifty crewmembers dead and ninety
wounded. In a raid on 1 July 1941, Prinz Eugen was hit with one bomb, killing fifty
and wounding thirty-four crewmembers. Scharnhorst sailed to La Pallice to conduct engine trials and gunnery/torpedo exercises that were to be held 21–26 July;
however, attacks by British bombers on 24 July scored five bomb hits and caused
extensive damage.3 Scharnhorst took on some three thousand tons of water.4
Between 23 November 1941 and the beginning of February 1942, the British
conducted twenty-five twilight or night air raids against the Brest Group.5 However, by the end of December 1941 the RAF concluded that, despite its intensive
air attacks, the German ships had not been damaged seriously. This was confirmed by Allied agents in Brest.6
GERMAN OPERATIONAL COMMAND ORGANIZATION
Both the Kriegsmarine (German navy) and Britain’s Royal Navy (RN) were highly centralized organizations. The Kriegsmarine was led by Grand Admiral Erich
Raeder; he also headed the Oberkommando der Marine (Naval High Command)
and was chief of the Seekriegsleitung (Naval Warfare Directorate—SKL), which
had been reestablished on 1 April 1937.7 The principal operational commanders
of the Kriegsmarine involved in Operation CERBERUS were the Flottenkommandant (commander of the fleet) and the commanders of Marinegruppenkommandos (Naval Group Commands) West and North. The fleet commander was General Admiral Otto Schniewind, who was appointed in June 1941.8 He exercised
control of all battleships, cruisers, torpedo boats, S-boats, auxiliary cruisers, and
fleet supply ships.9 Vice Admiral Otto Ciliax was Befehlshaber der Schlachtschiffe
(commander of battleships), appointed in June 1941.10 Admiral Ciliax was at the
same time commander of the Brest Group. He was embarked in Scharnhorst for
the operation. His alternate flagship was destroyer Z-29, the flagship of Commodore (one-star admiral) Erich Bey, Führer der Zerstörer (Leader of Destroyers).11
Torpedo-boat (T-boat) flotillas and S-boat flotillas that took part in the operation
were subordinate administratively to the Führer der Torpedoboote (Leader of
Torpedo Boats).12
The operational commanders of the forces that took part in Operation CERBERUS were General Admiral Alfred Saalwächter, Commander, Naval Group
Command West, with headquarters in Paris, France, and General Admiral
Rolf Carls, Commander, Naval Group Command North, with headquarters at
Wilhelmshaven-Sengwarden, Germany. Saalwächter was the supported commander, while Carls was the supporting commander.13 Naval Group Command
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West’s Operationsgebiet (operational area, similar to theater of operations) was
the Westraum (Western Area), consisting of the southern part of the North Sea,
the English Channel, and the waters off the French Atlantic coast.14 The Brest
Group came under the operational control of Naval Group Command North
after it transited across the boundary of Naval Group Command West at the
latitude of Zeebrugge, Belgium (see map 1).15 Naval Group Command North’s
operational area encompassed the central and northern parts of the Nordsee
(North Sea), the waters of Norway, and the Nordmeer (Arctic).16
As the supported commander, Admiral Saalwächter had overall responsibility
for the planning and execution of CERBERUS.17 The Befehlshaber der Sicherung
West (Commander, Security Forces, Naval Group Command West—BSW) was
Commodore Friedrich Ruge, with headquarters in Paris. Directly subordinate to
Ruge were the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Security Divisions. The 2nd Security Division
was responsible for the coastal area from the Scheldt estuary to Cherbourg, the
3rd from Cherbourg to the latitude of Saint-Nazaire, and the 4th from SaintNazaire to the Franco-Spanish border. These security forces were responsible
for surveilling coastal waters, providing escorts to larger warships and convoys
carrying raw materials (e.g., iron ore from Spain) and troops, maintaining routes
free from enemy mines, and laying defensive minefields.18 Protection of the
southern part of the North Sea was the responsibility of the 1st Security Division
(established in February 1941). This division was subordinate to Naval Group
Command West until October 1941, then was transferred to the Befehlshaber der
Sicherung der Nordsee (Commander, Security Forces of the North Sea—BSN),
who was responsible for the area from the Scheldt River estuary to Hanstholm in
the northern part of Denmark.19
The principal operational-level command of the Luftwaffe (German air force)
in the west was the 3rd Air Fleet, with headquarters in Paris and units based in
northern France, Belgium, and the Netherlands; it was led by Field Marshal Hugo
Sperrle. In February 1942, major subordinate units were the IX Air Corps in Soissons, Flugführer Atlantik (Air Leader of the Atlantic) in Lorient, Jagdfliegerführer 2 (2nd Fighter Leader—Jafü 2) in Le Touquet, and Jafü 3 (3rd Fighter Leader)
in Deauville, plus three Luftgau Kommandos (air district commands): Holland,
Belgium–Northern France, and Western France (see sidebar).
BRITISH OPERATIONAL COMMAND ORGANIZATION
The highest British naval authority was the Admiralty, led by First Lord Albert V.
Alexander, a civilian. The First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff was Admiral Sir
Dudley Pound.20 The Home Fleet (created in 1902) was the largest operationallevel command in the Royal Navy; the waters around the British Isles constituted its operating area. The Home Fleet was organized into several type-force
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LUFTWAFFE ORDER OF BATTLE FOR OPERATION DONNERKEIL
CINC, LUFTWAFFE
(Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring, Berlin)

COMMANDER, LUFTWAFFE, CENTER
(General Hubert Weise, Berlin)
1st Night Fighter Division
6 air district commands (administrative): III, IV, VI, VII,
XI, XII

3RD AIR FLEET
(Field Marshal Hugo Sperrle, Paris)
IX Air Corps (operational) (Soissons)
Air Leader of the Atlantic (Fliegerführer Atlantik) (Lorient)
2nd Fighter Leader (Jagdfliegerführer 2—Jafü 2) (Colonel Joachim-Friedrich Huth, Le Touquet)
3rd Fighter Leader (Jafü 3) (Major Karl Hentschel,
Deauville)
Air district commands (administrative): Holland,
Belgium–Northern France, Western France

RECONNAISSANCE
123rd Reconnaissance Group (Toussus-le-Buc)
1.(F)/123 [1st squadron of the 123rd Group, Fern (longrange)] (Toussus-le-Buc)
3.(F)/123 (Lannion)
Temporary organization for Operation DONNERKEIL:
General der Jagdflieger / Inspector of Fighters
(Colonel Adolf Galland, Le Touquet, France)
Jafü 2 (Le Touquet)
Jafü 3 (Deauville, France)
Jafü Holland-Ruhrgebiet (established 1 February 1942)
(Schiphol-Amsterdam, Netherlands)
Jafü Deutsche Bucht (subordinate to Fighter Leader,
Center) (General Lieutenant Werner Junck,
Jever, Germany)

FIGHTER UNITS
Note: A regulation fighter wing had three groups,
and each group three squadrons, thus nine
squadrons per wing. The arrangement and
notations below reflect the original German
document.
Operational: 406 fighters (27 Me-110s, 125 Fw-190s,
254 Me-109s)
III/Night Fighter Wing 3 (Abbeville): (less 1 squadron)
II/Night Fighter Wing 1 (Koksijde): 3 squadrons
II/Fighter Wing 26 (Abbeville-Drucat): 20 + 16 aircraft (a/c)
I/Fighter Wing 2 (Calais-Marck): 8 + 12 a/c
I/Fighter Wing 26 (Saint-Omer-Arques): 32 a/c
III/Fighter Wing 26 (Coquelles): 32 a/c
II/Fighter Wing 2 (Calais-Marck): 32 a/c
III/Fighter Wing 2 (Gorhde): 32 a/c
II/Fighter Wing 26 (Maldegem): 16 a/c
I/Fighter Wing 26 (Moenbrecht): 16 a/c
II/Fighter Wing 2 (Schiphol [Spenburg]): 16 a/c
III/Fighter Wing 2 (Schiphol [Bergen]): 16 a/c
I/Fighter Wing 2 (Katwijk): 16 a/c
Sea search-and-rescue aircraft
3rd Air Fleet / Luftwaffe Commander Center, Berlin
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Sources: “Flottenbefehl für das Unternehmen DONNERKEIL,”
p. 52; Luftflotte 3, “Vorläufige Zusammenstellung des Jagdeinsatzes der Lfl. 3 am 12.2.1942,” p. 2; Unternehmen DONNERKEIL (zum Akt Kanaldurchbruch), RL 7/115, BA-MA.
Note: Particulars given in this sidebar are based on the sources
listed here. They may not align exactly with the particulars given
in the text, as that information is based on British and German
intelligence sources. The former reflects what we know now; the
latter reflects what the combatants thought they knew then.

commands (for carriers, battleships, battle cruisers, destroyers, and submarines),
each of which was led by a flag officer.21
Traditional major shore commands were at the Nore, Portsmouth, and Plymouth. The Nore Command (named after a sandbank in the Thames River estuary), led in peacetime by a vice admiral, was responsible for the Strait of Dover
and north to Flamborough Head, Yorkshire. The Portsmouth Command had
responsibility for the central part of the English Channel, from Newhaven to
Portland. This was the most prestigious of all major shore commands, and was
led by a four-star admiral. The Plymouth Command, also led by a four-star admiral, was responsible for the western part of the English Channel, the southwest
approaches, Bristol Channel, and the Irish Sea.22
The major wartime shore commands were the Orkneys and Shetlands, Rosyth,
and Dover. As the name implies, the Orkneys and Shetlands Command was responsible for defense of the Orkney archipelago and the Shetland Islands, north
of the Scottish mainland. The Rosyth Command was reactivated in August 1939;
its area of responsibility stretched from Cromarty in the north of Scotland down
to Flamborough Head in Yorkshire. The Dover Command, led by a vice admiral,
was carved out of the Nore Command, with a main responsibility of protecting
maritime traffic in the strait itself.23
In the operation against the Brest Group, participating aircraft came from the
Royal Navy’s Fleet Air Arm (FAA) and the RAF’s Coastal, Bomber, and Fighter
Commands. The FAA, with headquarters at Lee-on-Solent, was responsible for
providing air support to the fleet. In February 1942, the FAA was led by Rear Admiral Clement Moody. Coastal Command was led by General Philip Joubert de
la Ferté, with headquarters in Northwood. Its main responsibility was to defend
British (and later Allied) convoys from the attacks of U-boats and the Luftwaffe.
In 1941, the principal subordinate commands of Coastal Command deployed
on the British Isles were No. 15 Group, with headquarters in Liverpool; No. 16
Group, at Chatham, Kent (in southeast England); and No. 18 Group, at Pitreavie
Castle (near Rosyth, Scotland).24 The RAF’s Bomber Command was established
in July 1936. In World War II its main mission was to carry out “strategic” bombing of Germany and German-occupied territories. It was led by Air Vice-Marshal
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Jack Baldwin, with headquarters (after 1940) at High Wycombe, in Buckinghamshire. RAF Fighter Command, with headquarters at Bentley Priory in northwest
London, was established in July 1936. Its main mission was to provide air cover
for bombers and RN ships.
GERMAN DECISION-MAKING
Preliminary Discussions
The question whether the Brest Group should remain in Brest or redeploy to
home waters (and then to Norway) was discussed in great detail by Admiral
Raeder, the commanders of the naval groups, and the commander of battleships beginning in the late spring of 1941 and continuing into the first few
weeks of January 1942. Admiral Raeder and some members of his staff and
the staff of Naval Group Command West also had meetings with Hitler at the
Wolfsschanze (Wolf ’s Lair), the führer’s headquarters near Rastenburg, East
Prussia (now Kętrzyn, Poland).
In a memo of 17 July sent to his operational commanders concerning the future employment of the heavy ships, Raeder discussed the advantages and disadvantages of using the English Channel for pocket battleships and cruisers. Among
the advantages were shorter transits to operating areas and the greatly reduced
possibility of suffering a total matériel and personnel loss. A major disadvantage
was the significant threat that enemy forces posed in the Vorfeld (outpost area
or patrolling area); such opposition included air forces once ships entered the
Hoofden (the triangular area Dover–Calais–Dunkirk) and the eastern part of the
North Sea. In Raeder’s view, the odds of deploying battleships successfully were
zero throughout the Channel, while those for cruisers were low. He concluded
that any transit that cruisers might conduct through the Channel needed to be a
planned operation, as did any corresponding material preparations applicable to
auxiliary cruisers and supply ships.25
During his meeting with Raeder on 29 December 1941, Hitler stated that the
enemy threat to Norway required redeploying Germany’s heavy ships to that area
as a deterrent. He considered Norway the “Schicksalzone” (Zone of Destiny) of
the entire war.26 (When he met with Raeder again on 22 January, Hitler said that
every German heavy surface ship that was not in Norway was in the wrong place;
Raeder fully agreed.27) With regard to the Brest Group, Raeder informed Hitler
that the intent was to have Prinz Eugen ready on 31 December 1941, Scharnhorst
on 5 January, and Gneisenau on 10 January 1942. Prior to the final sortie, the
group must carry out an exercise at the pier and receive gunnery personnel as
soon as possible. Exercising the ships at sea would be very risky, yet without that
training the ships could not be employed in combat.28
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Hitler believed that the enemy was well informed about all things and would
do everything possible to prevent a sortie from Brest. In Hitler’s view, it was pure
luck that the ships had been able even to complete their repairs. Beyond that, they
could not conduct underway training near Brest—exercises at sea would lead to
a catastrophe. An effective defense of the ships during those activities, even with
the strongest employment of the Luftwaffe, was impossible, he asserted—the
ships would be lost in any such circumstance. There was only one possibility:
seizing an opportunity of favorable weather conditions to speed a run up the
Channel to return home. If that failed, the ships should be decommissioned and
disarmed. Hitler stated that he must consider the overall situation; he could not
leave the ships’ crews and matériel unused when every man was needed at the
front. Hitler also believed that the time for large ships had passed; they were only
good for employment as aircraft carriers. Hitler stated that he understood the
Kriegsmarine found it difficult to accustom itself to his thinking, especially since
in the past he himself had been an advocate of very large ships. The problem now
was to use personnel and matériel purposefully.29
In his memo to Hitler of 8 January 1942, Raeder wrote that the Brest Group
should remain at Brest. However, if the ships did have to transit to Norway, there
were two route possibilities: through the Iceland passages or through the Channel. Return via the Iceland passages was possible only if the ships regained full
combat readiness. This would require longer underway operational training in
the Westraum. But even then, the current enemy situation did not offer favorable
prospects for a return through the Iceland passages.30
Raeder stated that even for a return through the English Channel, it was absolutely necessary to conduct a one-time trial cruise that would start in darkness
and conclude with a gunnery exercise in the morning hours. Raeder believed
that an unobserved return to Germany through the Channel was “barely possible.” The ships’ movements in and outside Brest would not escape the enemy’s
detection. The transit would require that minesweeping forces conduct a very
intensive search of the route immediately prior to sailing. Even the placing of beacon buoys at difficult navigational locations or points would arouse at least some
attention from the enemy. And even if the Germans achieved surprise initially,
at least by the time the ships were transiting the Strait of Dover the enemy would
be in a situation to use all available air forces, torpedo boats, destroyers, and
mines against them. Raeder pointed out that navigational difficulties abounded,
because of shallows, tides, and mines, although they could be overcome. Redeployment of the Brest Group, if it were ordered, should take place during the new
moon and the Schiebenstrom (push current).31 Raeder wrote that in the immediate future, those conditions would prevail on only four days: 11–14 (actually 15)
February. The weather also needed to be favorable for the operation.32
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In his memo, Raeder pointed out that the Germans lacked sufficient minesweeping forces to gain control of the mine situation. The effect of new types
of mines on heavy ships was unknown; “contact counter” mines could pose a
great danger, and there was no practical way to neutralize them. While the mine
danger to the Brest Group’s redeployment should not be overstated, countering
it would require bringing in modern minesweepers from the Baltic, even though
they were needed badly there to escort fast convoys, and were needed as well in
Norwegian waters. The redeployment also would require the temporary transfer
of three destroyers, then based in Norway, to Brest for service as escorts.33
Raeder anticipated that the enemy would employ his torpedo boats energetically, but that the battleships and escorts could be defended effectively against
their attacks. Even so, because of the small sea area involved it might not always
be possible to maneuver to avoid torpedoes fired from long range; hence, the possibility of chance torpedo hits could not be excluded. Raeder did not expect the
enemy heavy ships to be present during the Kanalmarsch (Channel march); they
might be brought to bear by the time operations were taking place in the southern
part of the North Sea, but even that was unlikely.34
Raeder believed it was the superior air forces the enemy could bring to bear in
the Channel that posed the greatest threat to the German battleships. In his view,
if the enemy successfully massed his air forces and employed them fully, no effective defense was possible, even if the Luftwaffe’s fighters were part of the picture.
Certainly, self-defense by the Brest Group and its escorts alone could not prevent
hits by bombs and torpedoes.35
Admiral Raeder came to the conclusion—on the basis of his discussions with
the commanders of Naval Group Command West, the fleet, the battleships, and
Security Forces West—that the return of the battleships through the Channel
would have a high probability of total loss, or at least heavy damages to the ships.
He concluded as follows: “I therefore see myself according to my innermost conviction not in a position to propose such a transfer operation.”36
Consequently, Raeder proposed to Hitler that the battleships remain at Brest,
operationally ready. Training in gunnery and protection via smoke screen should
continue. Germany would continue to enjoy the strategic effect of the battleships’
presence at Brest (supposedly reducing the burden on the Japanese in East Asia)
until the German situation in the northern area and the Atlantic improved. Raeder also told Hitler that he was strongly against disarming the heavy ships at Brest.
In his view, not only would doing so impose a heavy burden on the Kriegsmarine
and its officers, petty officers, and sailors; it would represent a great success for
the enemy naval leadership. It also would have negative effects in the northern
area (Norway) and on warfare in the Atlantic Ocean. The same likely was true of
the Indian Ocean; the action’s influence on Japan’s posture could not be foreseen.
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Raeder asserted that it would take one to two years to remove the guns from the
battleships and make them ready for use elsewhere. Writing as commander of
the Kriegsmarine, Raeder concluded, “Therefore, I want once again to urgently
advise against such measures, which are decisive for the development of the war
situation at sea and the future of the entire Kriegsmarine.”37
Hitler’s Decision
Hitler was firmly committed to redeploying the Brest Group to home waters.
The final decision was made at the meeting of Admiral Raeder and the commanders involved in the planning and execution of the operation at Hitler’s
main headquarters, held at Rastenburg on 12 January.38 At the meeting, Raeder
stated that the question of the Kanalmarsch was based on the führer’s desire that
the Kriegsmarine make its main task the defense of the Norwegian coast and
ports. Hitler acknowledged that in Brest the ships exerted a positive effect by
tying down enemy air forces; however, that effect continued only so long as they
remained undamaged. He said, “If I could see any chance of the ships remaining undamaged for four or five months, and a new situation is created allowing
their employment in the Atlantic, I might be more inclined to consider leaving
them at Brest,” but this would not happen. That being the case, the ships had to
be taken out of Brest rather than continuing to hope and trust they would not be
hit. Hitler also was very concerned by the worsening of Sweden’s posture toward
Germany; some information he possessed indicated a possibility of “NorwegianRussian [actually Swedish-Russian] action in northern Norway.” Hitler believed
the Norwegian coast must be defended by a strong group of battleships and cruisers. Employment of practically the entire German fleet, in cooperation with the
Luftwaffe, would be decisive in providing security to the Norwegian area. Hence,
he wanted, under all circumstances, to shift the Schwergewicht (main weight) of
German naval forces to Norway.39
The discussion at Hitler’s headquarters also dealt with the details of the pending Kanalmarsch. Admiral Ciliax stated that the Brest Group must leave the port
in darkness and transit the Strait of Dover during daylight, because that offered
the best use of available defenses. Hitler agreed, but pointed out the value of
surprise, which would be enhanced by sailing out at the beginning of darkness.
Also discussed was the need for a strong fighter escort, especially on the day of
Durchbruch (penetration); Ciliax stressed the need for a continuous cover of at
least ten aircraft in “low cover” and ten aircraft in “high cover.” General Hans
Jeschonnek, Chief of the General Staff, Luftwaffe, believed that, with the 250
fighters available, continuous protection of the ships could not be maintained;
however, he promised to bring two heavy (night) fighter squadrons from other
air units to provide protection at dawn. Hitler also asked about the possibility
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of the Brest Group using the northern route (through the Denmark Strait past
Iceland), but remarked that he “did not care which route the ships took as long as
they ended up deployed to the Norwegian area.”40
Raeder; Admiral Kurt Fricke, Chief of Staff, Naval Warfare Directorate; and
Ciliax believed it was impossible to conduct comprehensive combat training at
Brest, because of the strength of the Home Fleet and a lack of support by the
Luftwaffe.41 Commodore Ruge stated that there was no 100 percent protection
against deepwater mines. Hitler again emphasized that the success of the operation depended on its secrecy. Hence, the commander of battleships and the Naval
Warfare Directorate should do everything to avoid giving the enemy advance
warning of the sortie from Brest. Raeder repeated that the Luftwaffe must provide
the strongest fighter protection, as well as conduct attacks on enemy airfields
in the early morning of X+1 (A+1, in Luftwaffe terms) and several days prior
to that. General Jeschonnek repeated that the Luftwaffe in the west, owing to
the general situation of the war, could not assign any larger number of fighters
to support Operation CERBERUS. However, he undertook to reconsider this if
Hitler ordered so. The Luftwaffe’s intent was to use 250 fighters in three shifts; in
contrast, Ciliax wanted to have sixty fighters provide standby cover, while the remaining 190 aircraft would provide cover in the afternoon hours of X+1.42 Hitler
again stressed the need to achieve surprise to enable a successful transit at Dover
during daylight hours; in his view, derived from experience, the British would
not make and execute decisions quickly enough to interrupt the transit. Hitler
compared the situation of the Brest Group to that of a cancer patient. “Without
an operation he will certainly die, while an operation was a ‘horse-cure’ and has
some chances of saving a patient.” Hence, Kanalmarsch must be executed. The
decision was made that the sortie would be carried out if the two battleships were
ready, even without the cruiser; or if one battleship and the cruiser were ready;
but not for the cruiser alone.43
BRITISH OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
The main sources of British intelligence were radio intercepts of German Enigma
messages and aerial photoreconnaissance. Some information on the Brest Group
was obtained by a French agent in Brest and British submarines patrolling off
the port.
On 17 and 19 December 1941, Enigma provided some valuable information about gunnery exercises that the crews of Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had
conducted between 1 and 14 December on board Admiral Scheer in the Baltic; the gunnery crews of Prinz Eugen practiced on board Admiral Hipper. On
16 December, photoreconnaissance revealed that Prinz Eugen was out of dry
dock; Gneisenau suffered more damages from a blast on 18 December, yet by
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23 December it too was already out of dry dock and back along the pier.44 Photoreconnaissance conducted on 29 and 30 December revealed the arrival of two
enemy destroyers and eight minesweepers at Brest.45
On 6 January, British bombers attacked Brest again and Gneisenau received
one bomb hit, but by 25 January the ship had been repaired, enabling it to carry
out engine trials and a gunnery exercise. Between 18 and 23 January, Enigma
intercepts indicated that the gunnery crews of Scharnhorst again had exercised on
board Admiral Scheer. Enigma also revealed that the battleship Tirpitz (the sister
ship of Bismarck, commissioned in February 1941) had moved to Norway in
mid-January. The Admiralty was concerned about the possibility that Tirpitz and
the Brest Group might operate together in the Atlantic. However, the Admiralty’s
Operational Intelligence Centre (OIC) assessed on 19 January that, “in the view
of the high degree of efficiency demanded by the Germans before their warships
undertake operational war cruises, it is possible that these vessels on leaving Brest
will . . . make for an area in which they can work up with comparative immunity.” The only such area was in the Baltic. In other words, all the activity at Brest
pointed not to a sortie into the Atlantic but to a breakout through the Channel.46
On 22 January, British photoreconnaissance showed three enemy destroyers and six E-boats in Brest. In its appreciation (the commander’s estimate of
the situation) of 24 January, the Admiralty stated its belief that Scharnhorst and
Gneisenau would sail out from Brest, and that Gneisenau was not yet ready but
would be operational by the end of January. On 25 January 1942, the German 5th
Destroyer Flotilla moved from the North Sea into the Channel.47 On 31 January,
British reconnaissance aircraft observed that all three heavy ships at Brest were
out of dry dock. That same day, both photoreconnaissance and Enigma indicated
that the two battleships had left the harbor during the night and returned in the
morning. The OIC concluded that the ships had carried out trials, probably at
Douarnenez Bay, sixteen miles northwest of Quimper, Brittany. This, in conjunction with the massing of the destroyers, five torpedo boats, and eight minesweepers, indicated that a departure from Brest was near at hand.48
On 3 February, the OIC summarized the German naval strength (excluding the Brest Group) that had accumulated in the area between Brest and Hoek
van (Hook of) Holland over the preceding ten days: seven destroyers, ten torpedo boats, twenty Minensuchboote (M-minesweepers—large, modern vessels),
twenty-five motor torpedo boats (MTBs) (between Boulogne and Hoek van
Holland), six Sperrbrecher (mine barrage breakers), and a number of smaller
vessels.49 On 5 February, the OIC stated that the several recent exercises by the
battle cruisers (actually battleships) and the raising of Admiral Ciliax’s flag in
Scharnhorst were indications of an impending departure from Brest.50 On 8 and
9 February, Scharnhorst was observed to be in dry dock again. Two more enemy
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destroyers arrived at Brest, bringing the total there to four.51 In the afternoon of
11 February, photoreconnaissance indicated that all three heavy ships were out
of dry dock.52 Torpedo booms were in place protecting the ships.53 Yet there was
no sign of an unusual concentration of enemy fighters.54 That same afternoon,
the British submarine HMS Sealion, on patrol off Brest, drew closer to the port’s
entrance but did not observe the enemy’s big ships.55
GERMAN OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
Leading up to Operation CERBERUS, Germany’s Marinenachrichtendienst (Naval
Intelligence Service—MND) possessed fairly accurate knowledge of the naval,
air, and mine situation in the English Channel and its approaches.56 Its estimate
of the British order of battle was based on radio intercepts conducted by the
Beobachtung-Dienst (Observation Service—B-Dienst), the Kriegsmarine’s naval
intelligence radio-intercept service; no information on enemy forces was obtained by air reconnaissance. The Germans believed that a majority of the Home
Fleet’s heavy ships were based in northern Scotland—specifically, that four battleships (King George V, Duke of York, Howe [not combat ready], and Rodney), one
carrier (Victorious), and six cruisers (including one or two heavy cruisers) were
located in that area. In the Iceland area were one battleship (Renown) and two
to four heavy cruisers. Based on the British west coast were two carriers (Formidable and Illustrious) and one battleship (Nelson [under repair in the Clyde]).
In the Channel area was one cruiser (Hawkins [returned from East Asia at the
beginning of December 1941, and probably under repair]). The presence of other
enemy cruisers was possible.57
The Germans assumed that the enemy light forces—two cruisers and one
destroyer flotilla—were in Plymouth, while individual destroyers for escorting convoys were based at the Channel ports. Two antiaircraft (AA) cruisers
and several destroyer groups were based in ports on England’s eastern coast.
The Germans believed—incorrectly—that fifteen to twenty MTBs, ten motor
gunboats (MGBs), and ten motor antisubmarine (A/S) boats were based on the
Channel coast and that of southeastern England. They made this overestimation
on the basis of the enemy’s use of groups of six to eight boats in his attacks on
German coastal shipping moving through the Channel.58 This miscalculation of
the number of MTBs they faced considerably affected the Germans’ assessment
of the threat the enemy would pose to the Brest Group during its transit of the
Strait of Dover.
The Germans had some information about the presence of enemy submarines in Devonport (part of the Plymouth area, in southwest England). They
speculated that these submarines were in the process of being transferred to the
Mediterranean or were undergoing training and trials, or both. On the basis of
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radio direction finding (RDF) fixes obtained on 20 and 27 January, the Germans
also established the presence of enemy submarines in the North Sea. The enemy
had patrol craft and minesweeping units in the Thames estuary and on England’s
North Sea coast. The Germans had information that convoys between Bristol in
the west of England and the western portion of the Channel ran every two days
(one northbound and one southbound), and convoys between the Thames and
Portsmouth in the south of England ran every eight days (in both directions).59
The Germans lacked precise information on the enemy coastal gun batteries
in the Strait of Dover; however, they assumed that he had coastal defenses in the
south of England. They also believed that the enemy had installed radars along
the entire English coast. The effective range of these radars against surface targets
was estimated to extend up to thirty-five nautical miles.60
German naval intelligence estimated that the enemy had a considerable
number of reconnaissance aircraft based in southern England. Specifically,
these forces consisted of the 16th Group at Chatham (five squadrons of landbased reconnaissance aircraft) and the 19th Group at Plymouth (six squadrons
of land-based aircraft and seven squadrons of seaplanes). The MND noted that
the enemy had increased the intensity of air reconnaissance in December 1941,
especially in the Brest area. All reconnaissance flights were focused on detecting
the German surface ships.61
German naval intelligence believed that all five enemy bomber groups considered relevant, comprising sixty-seven squadrons, were deployed in southern
and southeastern England. They were employed in attacking targets in Germany
and occupied territories. These attacks were conducted using the 1st, 3rd, and 5th
Groups, with forty-one squadrons, and predominantly during the night hours.
Large-scale attacks were conducted against naval bases/ports at Brest and La Pallice, France. The 2nd Group, with fourteen squadrons, conducted daylight attacks
on German ships. Yet the Germans believed that the 2nd Group also might conduct night attacks on the Brest Group. (The 4th Group, with twelve squadrons,
was used for mining.)62
The Germans estimated that the enemy’s 10th and 11th Fighter Groups, believed to be based at Felton (actually Bentley Priory) and Uxbridge in southern
England, respectively, could be employed in the Channel and the Brest area.
These groups had forty-five squadrons of single-engine fighters and seventeen
squadrons of twin-engine fighters. Each squadron consisted of fifteen aircraft.
Only about 60 percent of these enemy fighters were combat ready. Twin-engine
fighters were predominantly used at night.63
German naval intelligence also evaluated the mine situation on both the main
and avoidance routes projected for the Brest Group’s Channel transit. The Germans believed that the enemy’s mine activity was focused on German maritime
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traffic routes, the entrances to ports, and avoidance routes in coastal waters.
They judged that the threat posed by the enemy’s “moored and moored remotely
activated mines will be strongly reduced in the entire area owing to dominant unfavorable current and tidal conditions.” The enemy’s ground mines posed a great
threat in the Strait of Dover and in shallow water. While the Germans believed
there was little danger in conducting mine-avoidance maneuvers in the section
of the route running through deep water, any avoidance maneuvers conducted
in the declared warning area or mined area in the Strait of Dover would be very
dangerous.64
GERMAN PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
To ensure a successful outcome for Operation CERBERUS, the German planners
had to define and then satisfy, or at least address, the following several key considerations: (1) the month, day, and time of sailing out; (2) the time of day for
transiting the Strait of Dover; (3) the threat from enemy forces; (4) achieving
surprise; (5) the route and waypoints; (6) weather conditions; (7) the size and
composition of the screen; and (8) the mine situation.
Timing of Sailing Out
The primary factor in selecting the time of year for the sortie was the length of
the night; the longer the night, the greater the possibility of a successful transit
from Brest to home waters. Given that winter nights are the longest, the time
frame for executing the operation needed to be the beginning to the middle of
February.65 Admiral Ciliax requested delaying the sortie until March, but SKL
rejected this because the nights only would get shorter and brighter, lessening
the possibility of achieving surprise on departure, which would favor the enemy.
In addition, a four-week delay would allow the enemy to carry out more air raids
against Brest.66
Selection of the day for the sortie also depended on the occurrence of the new
moon. After the beginning of February 1942, the first new moon occurred on
15 February. Hence, the group’s departure was set for 11 February.67 During that
period, the duration of full darkness was twelve hours.68 Tides played a crucial
role because of the need to have sufficient depth of water for safe navigation and
to provide adequate clearance from mines, as the route was swept for mines up
to a depth of thirty-nine feet (twelve meters).69 To reduce the danger of activating
ground mines, the most favorable timing of the sortie was during the new moon,
when spring tides (the highest [and lowest]) would occur. A tidal current of four
to five knots was predicted during that period at Ouessant (Ushant), Cap de la
Hague, and Calais.70 The naval planners had in hand a tidal current prediction
from the Marine Observatory in Wilhelmshaven (see map 2). The planners also
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considered making use of the strongest possible current in their selection of a
time frame for executing Operation CERBERUS.71
Timing of the Dover Transit and the Threat from Enemy Forces
The Germans could time the transit of the Strait of Dover for the nighttime or
daylight hours. The distance from Brest to Cherbourg is about 240 miles, and
some 120 miles of water separate Cherbourg and the Strait of Dover. The Brest
Group could transit one of those segments during darkness, but not both.72
At first glance, it might seem to make sense to pass the Strait of Dover during the night. However, this would require the Brest Group to sortie during the
morning of 11 February, and during the daytime early detection of the Brest
Group—before it entered the Strait of Dover—would be unavoidable. The German planners believed that the enemy would have timely warning that the group
had departed Brest, enabling him to concentrate not only his torpedo bombers
and heavy bombers but his torpedo boats. He also might be able to employ heavy
units out of Scapa Flow in a timely manner; the distance from Scapa Flow to
Terschelling in the West Frisian Islands is 450 nautical miles, while the distance
from Brest to Terschelling is 575 nautical miles. During the night the main disadvantages for the German ships would be the lack of adequate fighter protection
and the ineffectiveness of the ships’ AA guns and defenses against enemy torpedo
boats.73
Conversely, transit of the Brest Group through the Strait of Dover during
daylight offered a different set of advantages and disadvantages. The Germans
concluded that conducting the transit during daylight would allow moreeffective protection by Luftwaffe aircraft from expected attacks by enemy MTBs
and torpedo bombers while the ships were in the navigationally confining waters
of the English Channel (i.e., before they passed through the Strait of Dover and
thence into the North Sea). While enemy torpedo bombers and heavy bombers
would pose a greater threat to the transit during daylight than during darkness,
enemy aircraft would encounter very effective AA defenses by the Brest Group
and German fighters.74
The main threats to the Brest Group during its transit of the Strait of Dover
would be torpedo bombers and torpedo boats. The German planners believed
that the enemy enjoyed tactically favorable conditions for the employment of
torpedo bombers and torpedo boats in the eastern part of the Channel (between
Étaples-sur-Mer and Dunkirk), where his coastal radars could detect the German
ships. The enemy torpedo boats were based in that area, and night attacks even
by enemy torpedo aircraft could be expected. Despite all the jamming efforts the
Germans intended to carry out, their ships could not count on remaining undetected during that part of the transit. Hence, this section of the route “must be
transited during the daylight.”75
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Thus, Admiral Ciliax’s initial intent was to sail out from Brest at 1630 on 11
February (X-day). From then until about 2020, the Brest Group would sail on
a deceptive course at twenty-five knots. Having turned onto its true course,
the group would pass the latitude of Cherbourg at about 0415 on 12 February,
Terschelling at 1900 (sundown), and Borkum (in the East Frisian Islands) at
2100.76
However, the final plan envisaged the Brest Group casting off at 2030 on 11
February.77 Ushant would be passed at 2400. By cruising at twenty-five knots,
aided by the strong following current, the Brest Group would pass the latitude
of Dieppe at sunrise and the Strait of Dover at 1230, shortly after high water. By
sundown on X+1, the larger part of the Brest Group would reach a position off
Egmond aan Zee, Netherlands.78
Achieving Surprise
Perhaps most important to the success of Operation CERBERUS was the factor of
surprise. The German intent was to sail undetected up the English Channel for
as long as possible; the longer the true German intent was not recognized, the
less time the enemy would have to react. Yet surprise should have been almost
impossible to achieve, given the highly unfavorable geographic situation and the
enemy’s ability to monitor movements in the Channel. However, the Germans
were highly creative in combining diverse tactical, technical, and organizational
measures to enable them to surprise the enemy; most important of these was
extensive jamming of British radars.79
Given the assumed range of the British land-based sea-target radars of thirtyfive nautical miles, the most dangerous area during the proposed penetration
was between the Somme River estuary and Dunkirk; the earlier part of the route,
from Brest to the Somme estuary, runs no closer than forty nautical miles from
the English coast, preventing land-based radars from detecting the Brest Group
there. The Germans would be able to track the Brest Group using Ortunggeräte
(location devices—their equivalent of RDF) on the island of Guernsey and near
Cherbourg. The chief of MND requested installation of such a device at middistance between Fécamp and Dieppe. The Germans could conduct continuous
tracking of their ships with their own location devices in the area between the
Somme estuary and Dunkirk. The MND chief also intended to have installed on
board the flagship (Scharnhorst) a DeTe-Erkennungsgerät (radar detector). The
flagship also would have one radar jammer installed aboard, operating on the
wavelength of the enemy’s sea-target devices. The MND chief promised that ten
radar jammers against the enemy’s coastal sea-surface radars would be installed
on the Channel coast by mid-February 1942. Both the Kriegsmarine and the
Luftwaffe would conduct radar jamming simultaneously.80
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Besides CERBERUS, the Germans used five different code words (KORSIKA,
MANDARINE, GANGES, TORERO, and LABYRINTH) to enhance the secrecy of
various aspects of the pending operation, and they changed these code words
often.81 To preserve secrecy, Admiral Ciliax directed that knowledge of the operation order be limited to the smallest number of people. Orders to the destroyers and torpedo boats would be issued only a short time before sailing out. The
S-boats and Security Forces of Naval Group Commands West and North would
be provided only the information necessary to execute their tasks.82 To maintain
secrecy with regard to their preparations, the Germans conducted repeated mine
sweeps, covering the entire route through the English Channel. This also helped
to maintain secrecy even among the forces involved in the operation; the flotillas
were given some pretext when ordered to conduct sweeps of small portions of the
route, while being kept ignorant of the overall plan. Any minefields located during this process were swept away or else the route was changed to avoid them.83
To enhance the secrecy of Operation CERBERUS, preparatory measures were
kept to a minimum. However, SKL possibly exposed the intent when it ordered
some tankers to be moved out of the area of Naval Group Command West on 4
February. A serious breach of security occurred on 16 January 1942, when an
officer from Gneisenau informed a shipyard worker in Kiel that the ship subsequently might undergo further dry-docking in that port, and that the shipyard
already was prepared for its arrival. Whether this officer actually had knowledge
of the intent or simply was chattering thoughtlessly—or both—is unknown.84
As part of ensuring operational security by keeping the circle of those “in the
know” small, only the commanding officers of the three heavy ships and some
staff officers were informed about the entire operation.85 Others were told that
the purpose of the sortie was to conduct a joint exercise with the Luftwaffe south
of Brest; targets and tugs were directed to waters off Saint-Nazaire for gunnery
practice, and A/S patrols were conducted in the same area. Supposedly, the ships
would leave Brest after sunset on 11 February, carry out their exercises between
La Pallice and Saint-Nazaire on 12 February, then return to Brest on the night
of 12/13 February. The usual small numbers of personnel from the ships’ crews
were sent on leave.86
Most staff officers were led to believe that some valuable units would be moved
through the Channel—from east to west, not west to east.87 However, some officers in the Brest Group began to speculate (correctly) about the true purpose
of the pending sortie. Senior Commander Hans-Jürgen R. Reinicke, Admiral Ciliax’s chief of staff, decided to put a stop to these rumors with an unusual trick. He
persuaded an officer in Paris to send a fake invitation from Admiral Saalwächter,
Commander, Naval Group Command West, to all captains and commanders
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in his command for a dinner on 12 February. This would require them to leave
Brest on 11 February. The invitation was handled through the ships’ offices in
unclassified form and was received and answered quite seriously; it proved to be
“a wonderful remedy against rumors and suspicions.”88
The Luftwaffe’s success depended on the enemy not becoming alarmed by a
large-scale transfer of fighters. The 3rd Air Fleet’s planning to support the Brest
Group stipulated that “only the circles of people who must without question have
knowledge of it in order to carry out their work are to be initiated into the real
aim of the undertaking.”89 Other members of the 3rd Air Fleet who took part in
the operation were told that a merchant ship with very important cargo was to
transit the Channel from east to west.90
The Route
Generally, the following three conditions had to be satisfied in selecting a route
for the Brest Group: (1) passing over deep water to minimize the danger from
contact mines; (2) as far as possible, remaining beyond the effective range of
enemy radars; and (3) traveling at high speed to shorten the transit time.91 The
route also should be navigationally simple. These factors were intertwined—for
instance, routing the ships over deep water would allow the Brest Group to sail at
high speed, and it would reduce the danger from moored and ground magnetic
mines.92 The danger from acoustic mines needed to be taken fully into account
as well. The movement had to be carried out in several stages because enemy
torpedo-boat and torpedo-bomber attacks and difficult navigational conditions
could be expected.93
The resultant route was determined jointly by the commander of battleships
and Naval Group Command West staffs. The route ran some 30.5 nautical miles
west of Ushant and then over deep water to a point in the estuary of the Somme
River. The distance to be traveled from Brest to that point was some three hundred nautical miles, or eleven hours of steaming. Even though the route ran close
to the French coast, the water was in fact deep: between sixty-five and ninetyeight feet (twenty to thirty meters). The route passed to the eastward of Vergoyer
Bank; past Boulogne, at three nautical miles distance; and around Cap Gris-Nez,
at a distance of only one and a half nautical miles, between Sandettié and Outer
Ruytingen. Before the Strait of Dover the route would keep the ships some thirtyfive nautical miles away from England’s coast, but after that point it would run
within the effective range of the enemy coastal radars.94
The Weather
Weather conditions played a major role in German planning for the operation.
The ideal weather (for their purposes) would be conditions bad enough to make
it difficult for the enemy to employ his torpedo forces—boats and, especially,
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bombers. On the other hand, such weather would not facilitate German employment of screening forces and fighter aircraft.95 This was a very complex problem,
because weather conditions ideal for the Brest Group and its screening forces
were diametrically opposite to those ideal for the employment of the 3rd Air
Fleet’s aircraft. Ideal conditions for the Luftwaffe would be to have weather over
southeast England that was so bad it prevented British aircraft from operating,
or at least hindered them, while simultaneously the conditions prevailing over
airfields in France and the Low Countries were favorable for taking off and
landing.
For the Kriegsmarine, the main weather requirements were a lack of fog (so
the big ships could proceed at high speed), a low sea state (for the sake of the
torpedo boats and S-boats), and following winds.96 Good weather and visibility
were favorable for navigation and friendly air cover, and therefore unfavorable to
enemy attempts to conduct air reconnaissance of and aerial attacks on German
surface forces. Bad weather conditions would enhance the chance of the Brest
Group’s movement going unobserved and make it more difficult for the enemy
to employ his light forces; however, they also would reduce the effectiveness of
the efforts of Security Forces West.97
Escorts
The transit would require the use of a relatively large number of escorts—for
instance, more than those needed to screen German convoys traveling along the
French Atlantic coast. Owing to the danger from mines, the Brest Group had to
sail neatly lined up in a column, enhancing the threat from torpedo bombers and
torpedo boats; this factor required doubling the usual number of escorts. However, Admiral Ciliax believed that, except in the area around Brest itself, there was
little likelihood of encountering enemy submarines.98
Both Saalwächter and Ciliax agreed that for a group of two heavy ships, at least
twelve escorts (four to six in the inner screen and the remainder in the outer screen)
would be required, and at least sixteen escorts (six to eight in the inner screen and
the remainder in the outer screen) for a group of three ships.99 The inner screen
would be composed of destroyers and torpedo boats, while the outer screen would
consist of S-boats. In addition, during daylight hours Admiral Ciliax would be able
to count on support from all available S-boats in the area of transit.100
Mines
The mine situation was an important factor in the planning for the redeployment
of the battleships through the Channel. A data point for comparison was a different confined area especially threatened with mines: the German route through
the southeastern part of the warning area in the German Bight. In that area, on
10 November 1941, a Swedish steamer had been sunk.101
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The Operations Department of SKL noted that the enemy could not mine
certain parts of the Strait of Dover, because he had to use routes there himself;
however, in addition to the mine barriers laid earlier in the Strait of Dover, the
enemy laid an additional barrier northwest of the Outer Ruytingen Channel.
Hence, it was necessary to mark searched routes with buoys.102
GERMAN PLANS
In planning the redeployment of the Brest Group, the Germans used their experience in redeploying the heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper from the German Bight to
Brest in November 1940. That experience had shown that the number of destroyers and boats available always ended up being smaller than planned, because of
mechanical malfunctions. In the earlier instance, air cover was provided from
sunrise to darkness by at least six fighters; during the night, heavy fighters were
used. Additional strong fighter units were kept in a state of high readiness in the
coastal area in case of an attack by strong enemy surface forces. For deception,
one training cruiser (Nürnberg) was deployed off the Norwegian coast; the aim
was to make the enemy believe that the cruiser would attempt a northern penetration maneuver (through the Greenland–Iceland–Scotland passages).103
The Germans developed separate but highly coordinated naval and air plans
for their redeployment of the Brest Group. In line with standard German practice, Admiral Saalwächter issued an operational instruction and an operation
order for Operation CERBERUS, while Admiral Ciliax issued only an operation
order. Field Marshal Sperrle issued an operation order for the employment of
his Luftwaffe units in support of the Brest Group, code-named DONNERKEIL
(THUNDERBOLT).
In his operational instruction, issued on 1 February, Admiral Saalwächter
specified that the Aufgabe (task) of the Brest Group was to “penetrate” the English Channel to the homeland during the new moon period of February 1942.
The Brest Group would consist of two battleships (Gneisenau and Scharnhorst)
and one heavy cruiser (Prinz Eugen). It would be escorted by the 5th Destroyer
Flotilla of six destroyers. Screening forces consisted of the 2nd, 3rd, and 5th Tboat Flotillas (T-flotillas) and the 2nd, 4th, and 6th S-boat Flotillas (see sidebar).
Both escort and screening forces were under the temporary tactical control of the
Leader of Destroyers.104
Admiral Saalwächter directed that the operation would be executed when at
least one battleship was ready for breakout; it would be canceled if only the heavy
cruiser was ready to sail out. In a case in which the sailing out from Brest (X-day)
was delayed for only a short time, the operation still would be executed; if that
delay stretched to more than two hours, however, the Brest Group would not
sortie until a new code word was issued.105
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GERMAN NAVAL ORDER OF BATTLE FOR OPERATION CERBERUS
CINC, German Navy; Head, Naval High Command;
Chief, Naval Warfare Directorate
(Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, Berlin)
Fleet Commander
(General Admiral Otto Schniewind)
Naval Group Command West
(General Admiral Alfred Saalwächter, Paris)
Commander, Battleships
(Vice Admiral Otto Ciliax)

THE BREST GROUP
Commander, Brest Group
(Vice Admiral Otto Ciliax, in Scharnhorst)
2 battleships: Scharnhorst, Gneisenau
1 heavy cruiser: Prinz Eugen
Leader of Destroyers
(Commodore Erich Bey, in Z-29)
5th Destroyer Flotilla, 6 destroyers: Richard Beitzen
(Z 4), Paul Jacobi (Z 5), Friedrich Ihn (Z 14),
Hermann Schoemann (Z 7), Z-25, Z-29

SCREENING FORCES
Leader of Torpedo Boats
(Captain Hans Bütow, Scheveningen, The Hague)
2nd Torpedo-Boat Flotilla (T-flotilla) (Le Havre): T-2, T-4,
T-5, T-11, T-12
3rd T-flotilla (Dunkirk): T-13, T-14, T-15, T-16, T-17
5th T-flotilla (Vlissingen): Kondor, Falke, Seeadler, Iltis,
Jaguar
2nd S-boat Flotilla (IJmuiden), 10 boats: S-29, S-39,
S-53, S-62, S-70, S-103, S-104, S-105, S-108,
S-111
4th S-boat Flotilla (Boulogne), 9 boats: S-48, S-49, S-50,
S-51, S-52, S-64, S-109, S-110, S-107 [no
crew]
6th S-boat Flotilla (Ostend), 8 boats: S-18, S-19, S-20,
S-22, S-24, S-69, S-71, S-101

SECURITY FORCES WEST
(Commodore Friedrich Ruge, Paris)
Forces that took part in the operation consisted of 21
M-boats, 22 R-boats, 21 luggers, 7 fishing
steamers (FDs), 9 mine barrage breakers; for
A/S duties: 21 luggers and submarine chasers
They were organized as follows:
1st M-flotilla (6 modern M-boats) (probably from the
Baltic, assigned here only for duration of
CERBERUS)
2nd M-flotilla (8 modern M-boats) (Brest)
5th M-flotilla (3 modern M-boats) (probably from the
Baltic)
12th M-flotilla (7 fishing trawlers) (Brest)
2nd R-flotilla (10 R-boats) (probably from the Baltic)
3rd R-flotilla (5 R-boats) (Boulogne)
4th R-flotilla (7 R-boats) (Boulogne)
18 beacon boats (16 outpost patrol boats, 2 R-boats)
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SECURITY DIVISIONS
2nd Security Division (Souverain-Moulin, near Boulogne)
3rd R-flotilla, 4th R-flotilla, 36th R-flotilla, 38th R-flotilla
15th Outpost Patrol Boat (Vp) Flotilla, 18th Vp-flotilla
4th Mine Barrage Breaker Flotilla
3rd Security Division (Brest)
2nd M-flotilla, 12th M-flotilla, 40th M-flotilla
8th R-flotilla
14th Submarine Chaser (U-J) Flotilla
2nd Vp-flotilla, 7th Vp-flotilla
6th Mine Barrage Breaker Flotilla
4th Security Division (La Rochelle)
8th M-flotilla, 16th M-flotilla, 42nd M-flotilla
4th Vp-flotilla
2nd Mine Barrage Breaker Flotilla
18 beacon boats (10 FDs, 2 R-boats, 5 whalers, 1 pilot
boat)

NAVAL GROUP COMMAND NORTH
(General Admiral Rolf Carls, WilhelmshavenSengwarden)

SECURITY FORCES NORTH
(Rear Admiral Eberhard Wolfram, WilhelmshavenSengwarden)
1st Security Division (Utrecht-Oudenrijn)
3rd M-flotilla, 6th M-flotilla, 17th M-flotilla, 18th Mflotilla, 31st M-flotilla
5th R-flotilla
1st Mine Barrage Breaker Flotilla
8th Vp-flotilla, 11th Vp-flotilla, 12th Vp-flotilla
11th U-J-flotilla
2nd Antiaircraft Hunter Flotilla

SECURITY FORCES EAST
(Rear Admiral Herbert Stohwasser, Aalborg, Denmark)
3rd M-flotilla, 19th M-flotilla
3rd Mine Barrage Breaker Flotilla
9th Vp-flotilla, 10th Vp-flotilla, 17th Vp-flotilla, 19th
Vp-flotilla
1 net obstacle unit (2 net layers, 1 net lighter, 2 netlaying tenders)
1 training ship

LOGISTICAL SUPPORT
4 tankers: Heligoland (1), Wilhelmshaven/Jade (2),
Wesermünde (1)
1 supply ship (Heligoland)
17 seagoing tugs: Vlissingen (2), Hoek van Holland (4),
Den Helder (2), Ems-Borkum (2), Jade (2),
Heligoland (3), Wesermünde (2)
Sources: “Operationsbefehl des Befehlshabers der Schlachtschiffe für Operation GANGES,” p. 12; Marinegruppenkommando
West, “Operative Weisung für Marsch der Brestgruppe durch
den Kanal nach Osten,“ p. 29; “Brennstoffbereitstellung,”
Anlage 2 in “Operationsbefehl des Befehlshabers der Schlachtschiffe für den Marsch der Brestgruppe,” p. 85; “Verteilung der
Seeschlepper,” Anlage 3 in “Operationsbefehl des Befehlshabers der Schlachtschiffe für den Marsch der Brestgruppe”;

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol74/iss3/7

24

124

Vego:
NAVARedeployment
L WA R C O L L E G E Rof
E V Ithe
E W German Brest Group through the English Channe

Befehlshaber der Sicherung West, “Aufstellung der B.S.W.—
Streitkräfte,“ pp. 112–14; Lohmann and Hildebrand, “Marinegruppenkommandos Ost-Nord-West,” pp. 40-3, 40-6; Lohmann and Hildebrand, “Sicherungsstreitkräfte,“ pp. 61-3, 61-4,
61-6, 61-7; Giermann, Schnellbootseinsätze der Kriegsmarine
im Westraum 1942–43, p. 13; Gerhard Hümmelchen, Die
deutschen Schnellboote im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Hamburg/Berlin/Bonn: E. S. Mittler & Sohn, 1996), pp. 65–66; Hans Frank,
Die deutschen Schnellboote im Einsatz: Von den Anfängen bis
1945 (Hamburg/Berlin/Bonn: E. S. Mittler & Sohn, 2006), p. 56.
Note: Particulars given in this sidebar are based on the sources
listed here. They may not align exactly with the particulars given
in the text, as that information is based on British and German
intelligence sources. The former reflects what we know now; the
latter reflects what the combatants thought they knew then.

Admiral Saalwächter’s operational instruction specified the following timeline
for passage through the selected points on the route:
X-day 2400

Ouessant (Ushant)

X+1 0600

Cap de la Hague

X+1 0930

Point Q(uatsch) (latitude 50° N, longitude 00°30′ E)

X+1 1300

Point Ä(rger) (latitude 51°05′ N, longitude 01°45′ E)

X+1 1630

Boundary-crossing point from Naval Group Command West
to Naval Group Command North106

The Brest Group would be screened by destroyers and torpedo boats. The
S-boats would be employed for defense against enemy MTBs.107 Long-range
gun batteries under the commander of the Pas de Calais sector were directed to
open suppression fires against enemy batteries during the passage of the Brest
Group.108 Air cover would be provided by Jafü 2, Jafü 3, and Jafü of the Deutsche
Bucht (German Bight). Reconnaissance would be conducted by the 3rd and 5th
Air Fleets. Sea search and rescue would be conducted by the 3rd Air Fleet and the
Luftwaffe’s Befehlshaber Mitte (Commander, Center), the command in charge of
Germany’s air defenses, established in March 1941 and located in Berlin.109
In his operation order to Ciliax, issued on 4 February, Saalwächter stated that
the task was “execution of the East March [Ostmarsch] with full employment and
use of high speed during new moon period.” (Note that the wordings describing
the task used in the operational instruction and the operation order were not
identical.) On 6 February, Saalwächter sent to Ciliax annex 7 of his operation
order, listing the composition of the minesweeping forces tasked to support the
Brest Group. Specifically, on X-day the 1st, 2nd, and 12th M-flotillas and the 4th
Räumboote (small minesweeper) Flotilla (R-flotilla) would take up their positions
in their assigned sectors of the route. In case of bad weather, the 5th M-flotilla
would replace the 4th R-flotilla and be put in immediate readiness at Boulogne;
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at the same time, the 3rd R-flotilla would be put in immediate readiness at Calais.
An attempt would be made to have in readiness two fishing steamers each at Cherbourg, Le Havre, Fécamp, Dieppe, Boulogne, Calais, and Ostend.110
Admiral Ciliax’s operation order for Operation GANGES (one of the alternate
code words used for the breakout operation) was issued on 4 February (it was
eighteen pages long, with some one hundred pages of appendices).111 In the paragraph titled “Information on the Enemy,” Ciliax wrote that the enemy would use
aircraft to attack the Brest Group with bombs and torpedoes. He also expected
night attacks by radar-fitted enemy aircraft. Yet the Germans were not overly
concerned about the enemy air attacks; they believed that their ships, accompanied by an effective destroyer screen and air cover and sailing at high speed,
would make difficult targets.112
The time of greatest danger for the Brest Group would be the afternoon of X+1.
Attacks by light forces would follow if the enemy learned about the movement of
the Brest Group. Ciliax anticipated that the enemy destroyers would be encountered
in the area north of Brittany and north of the Seine River estuary. East of longitude
01° W he expected attacks by enemy MTBs from their operating bases at Dover and
Ramsgate. In the night of X+2 (13/14 February), the enemy light forces could be
expected to attack the Brest Group, seeking to reduce its speed of advance.113
In his operation order, Ciliax pointed out the danger from enemy mines. He
stated that control of the entire route was not possible, because of an insufficiency
of minesweeping forces. And no protection was possible against the enemy’s
Zahlkontaktminen (moored mines fitted with contact counters).114
Admiral Ciliax estimated, correctly, that the danger of attack by the enemy’s
heavy surface forces was low. The extent of the enemy-mined area (the so-called
East Wall) and the German-mined area (the West Wall), plus additional enemy
mines laid in the Hoofden area, would pose difficulties for the employment of
enemy heavy forces. Ciliax also took into account the possibility of fire from
enemy coastal gun batteries; although Ciliax did not exclude the possibility of a
stray hit occurring, he believed fire from such guns would be inaccurate because
of the long distances to the German ships.115
In contrast to the operational instructions issued by Naval Group Command
West, Ciliax’s order initially contained thirteen code-named waypoints within
the area of Naval Group Command West and three waypoints within the area
of Naval Group Command North. After the Brest Group sailed out, the 5th
Destroyer Flotilla would join it; after sunrise on X+1, the 2nd T-flotilla from Le
Havre and the 3rd from Dunkirk would join them at Point Q. At 1300 on X+1,
the 5th T-flotilla, from Vlissingen, and the 4th S-boat Flotilla, based at Boulogne,
would join in two groups some 6.5–7.5 miles from Point Y (latitude 50°23.2′ N,
longitude 01°09.3′ E).116
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Ciliax’s operation order stated that the 3rd Security Division would secure
the Brest Group’s sailing out from Brest and its transit to Point Rosa 30 (latitude
48°28.6′ N, longitude 05°14.2′ W). It would provide defense against enemy submarines, aircraft, and surface forces up to fifteen nautical miles westward and
northward from Brest.117 Security Forces West envisaged employing the following minesweeping elements in support of the Brest Group: the 1st (six modern
M-boats), 2nd (eight modern M-boats), 5th (three modern M-boats), and 12th
M-flotillas (seven fishing trawlers); and the 2nd (ten R-boats) and 4th (seven Rboats) R-flotillas. The planners precisely determined the time frame and area for
each minesweeping flotilla to perform its duties.118
For navigational support, the Brest Group would rely primarily on nine beacon
boats anchored at specified waypoints.119 An annex to the operation order was
issued on 7 February by Security Forces North (subordinate to Naval Group Command North). Among other things, this annex described the route from the boundary point of Naval Group Command West / Naval Group Command North to the
German Bight, the ports designated for refueling, and the locations of sea tugs.120
The 3rd Air Fleet operation order for providing support to the Brest Group
was issued on 6 February. It specified that the Brest Group would sortie on A–1
(identical to X–1) after the fall of darkness. The group’s planned position at 0840
on A-day would be some twenty-two miles northwest of Cap d’Antifer; at 1400,
32.5 miles northwest of Calais; at 1930, some twenty-two miles northwest of
IJmuiden. The group then would steer toward the Elbe estuary. On A-day the
3rd Air Fleet would take over responsibility for providing fighter protection,
conducting reconnaissance, and engaging enemy air and naval forces.121
Colonel Adolf Galland, Inspector of Fighters, was appointed to control all
Luftwaffe units assigned to provide support to the Brest Group and its escorting
forces. He was directly subordinate to Commander, Luftwaffe Mitte, in Berlin;
intermediate levels were excluded from controlling fighters.122 Temporarily subordinate to Galland were Jafü 2, Jafü 3, and Jafü Holland-Ruhrgebiet (Schiphol/
Amsterdam). The Luftwaffe’s German Bight commander and his staff at Jever
were tactically subordinate to Colonel Galland. Galland’s main command post
was at Le Touquet, with alternate command posts at Caen, France; Schiphol/
Amsterdam, Netherlands; and Jever, Germany.123 Scharnhorst embarked a small
staff detachment from Jafü 3, led by a colonel, to direct the fighter aircraft supporting the Brest Group.124
Fighters would be employed in accordance with the Merkblatt (fact sheet) issued by the General of Fighters, entitled “Schutz von Geleitzügen und Einheiten
der Kriegsmarine durch Jagd- und Zerstörerverbände” (“Protection of Convoys
and Units of the Kriegsmarine by Fighters and Heavy [Night] Fighter Units”).
Fighters would provide cover for the Brest Group from dawn to twilight, at
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which point night fighters would take over.125 During daylight, air cover would
be provided by fighters of the 2nd Jagdgeschwader (Fighter Wing—J.G. 2) and
J.G. 26 (see sidebar). Colonel Galland’s plan was to have at least sixteen fighters
constantly over the Brest Group during daylight hours.126 Each sortie would last
about thirty-five minutes and each wave of fighters would arrive ten minutes
before the other left; this would result in an overlap of preceding and successive
waves of about twenty minutes, during which thirty-two fighters would be providing air cover.127 The released squadron then would fly back to its airfield; it
would sortie again in the afternoon to provide additional air cover. Colonel Galland’s plan would ensure continuous employment of fighters from 0830 to 1810,
using a combined 176 fighters and heavy (night) fighters. In reserve was the J.G.
1.128 The Schwerpunkt (weight of the main effort) of the attacks by fighters would
be the enemy torpedo bombers. In a case of weather bad enough that fighters
could not operate, heavy (night) fighters would provide direct protection of the
Brest Group.129 Galland also planned to have a force of fighters on the ground,
ready to take off, that would be large enough to meet British air attacks.130 For distraction, Kampfflugzeuge (combat aircraft—bombers) of the IX Air Corps would
conduct a feint attack on Portsmouth.131 If the weather was bad enough to prevent
the employment of both fighters and heavy fighters, combat aircraft of the IX Air
Corps would provide direct protection of the Brest Group.132
On direct orders from Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring, no Messerschmidt
Bf-109 fighter could fall into enemy hands; hence, they would not be allowed to
fly over the British coast. Before takeoff, all flight units would be briefed about
the probable position of friendly ships, but radio would not be used once aloft.
Any attacks within 120 kilometers (74.6 miles) of the French-Belgian coast
would be allowed only when the ships had been identified as hostile.133 AA
defenses in ports of refuge (Le Havre, Vlissingen, and Hoek van Holland) would be
reinforced.134
The Germans also prepared a plan for a comprehensive reconnaissance of the
North Sea and the English Channel, plus an area west to the Bristol Channel and
south to the Bay of Biscay. The flights involved would be conducted by the Air
Leader of the Atlantic, the 123rd Aufklärungsgruppe (Reconnaissance Group),
and the IX Air Corps, plus aircraft of the 5th Air Fleet (with headquarters in
Oslo, Norway). However, the reconnaissance plans of the 3rd Air Fleet were more
detailed than those cited in Ciliax’s operation order.135
BRITISH PLANS
The Admiralty consistently believed that the safest and thus most likely option
for the enemy battleships was for them to leave Brest and sail up through the
Channel. It believed (correctly) that after their long stay at Brest the ships could
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not be ready to operate as entirely effective fighting units; the enemy objective
must be to sail them to waters where they could “work up” in comparative safety.
Other options for the Germans were to break out into the Atlantic and work up
in open spaces there; proceed to the Mediterranean and work up at Genoa; or
return to German waters by breaking out into the Atlantic, then return to home
base by sailing through the passages north of Scotland. But breaking through the
Strait of Gibraltar or through the northern passages was a highly unfavorable option—the Brest Group would be at great risk of attack by either Force H (based at
Gibraltar) or the Home Fleet.136
British planning for a possible action to prevent the movement of enemy
ships from Brest to German home waters was conducted by two strategiclevel commands (the Admiralty and the Air Ministry), three operational-level
commands (Coastal Command, Fighter Command, and Bomber Command),
and three operational/tactical-level commands (Vice Admiral Dover, Commander in Chief [CINC] Nore, and the FAA). The Air Ministry had the lead
in planning.137
On 29 April 1941, the British prepared a plan, dubbed FULLER, to respond
to any German attempt to redeploy the Brest Group to home waters via the
English Channel. One of the main assumptions in Plan FULLER was that there
was a “strong probability that the enemy ships would seek to pass the Narrows
at Dover under cover of darkness.”138 Bomber Command’s Operation Order No.
133 of 1 May 1941 speculated that Scharnhorst and Gneisenau might try to reach
a German port by using the English Channel route. The move could take place
at any time, without prior warning. If passage were attempted by day, the ships
would be attacked by British surface ships and aircraft. During the passage up
the Channel the enemy would be able to provide a very high degree of fighter
protection by day. Unless suitable cloud cover was available, a British attack on
the ships would not be ordered except in areas where Fighter Command could
provide protection. These areas were anywhere east of Cherbourg to a line
between Dungeness and Boulogne, and in the Dungeness–Boulogne–Dunkirk–
North Foreland area. The planners considered it unlikely that the “enemy will
try to pass the Strait of Dover by daylight”; but if the Germans did so, “it will be
necessary to take advantage of the opportunity afforded by the fighter screen in
the area of attack [to attack] with the largest possible striking force.” The “intention” (objective) was to attack Scharnhorst and Gneisenau using the maximum
possible striking force if they attempted to make the passage between Cherbourg
and Dunkirk by daylight.139
To provide fighter escorts to the heavy bombers, arrangements would be
made between No. 3 and No. 11 Groups when the execution order was issued.
If possible, attacks by heavy bombers would be coordinated with attacks by
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torpedo bombers of the Coastal Command. If heavy bombers were used in the
Strait of Dover area, the fighter screen would be provided for no longer than
forty-five minutes. During that period air groups would attack with as many
bombers as possible. These attacks would be conducted by single aircraft and
at the discretion of group commanders; no coordination of attacks would be
possible. Only Scharnhorst and Gneisenau would be attacked. No. 5 Group
would hold two squadrons of Hampden medium bombers in readiness. Aerial
mining would be conducted at dusk or during the night, depending on the
situation. Fighter escorts could not be provided for these mining operations,
but a fighter patrol would be maintained in the area if mining was conducted
at dusk.140
Coastal Command’s Operational Instruction No. 104 of 8 September 1941
stated that “there is possibility that major German naval units in Brest might
attempt to reach a German port using English Channel probably through the
Strait of Dover during darkness. Prior warning of such a move may not be received, but it is thought that it might be preceded by a reinforcement of enemy
fighter strength in the neighbourhood of Cherbourg to cover the warships.”
After transiting the Strait of Dover, the enemy ships would probably steer “to
pass through the Outer Ruytingen Channel. This may present a favourable opportunity for sea mining.”141
The intention of Coastal Command was to destroy major enemy naval units
during their passage from Brest to a German port. It would conduct dawn and
dusk reconnaissance off Brest and Cherbourg. The crossover ASV (air-tosurface) radar patrols off Brest would be established at the direction of Air Officer Commanding (AOC)–CINC Coastal Command. The Brest–Cherbourg area
would be reconnoitered in the morning, while afternoon reconnaissance of the
sea area off Cherbourg would be conducted to the longitude of Greenwich (0°).
Bombing would be conducted if and when the German ships reached the area
east of the Cherbourg peninsula. If practicable, attacks by torpedo bombers from
Thorney Island (near Portsmouth) would be synchronized with the high-altitude
bombing attacks to take advantage of the fighter cover provided for the bombers.
A fighter escort would be provided for the torpedo attack by three squadrons
of the Tangmere Wing. Torpedo bombers would rendezvous with fighters over
Tangmere (West Sussex, England). Fighter Command would provide a supporting wing to cover the withdrawal of the attacking force. If the enemy ships
survived the passage through the Channel and the Strait of Dover, they would be
attacked as soon as possible by Coastal Command’s torpedo bombers. Alternatively, the torpedo bombers might be required to support mining conducted by
two squadrons of Hampdens from Bomber Command. The executive order for
this operation was code-named EXECUTE MALTA. If the enemy ships attempted
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their transit through the strait during daylight, Fighter Command would provide
a protective force for a short time over the area, so that bombing and torpedo attacks could be conducted; if possible, the attacks would be “timed to take place
whilst fighter cover is available.”142
The Bomber Command operation order, issued on 1 May 1941, laid down
conditions for an attack on the enemy ships. The requirements included a suitable cloud cover in any area where Fighter Command could not be expected to
operate. The original Air Ministry letter warned about the possibility of a daylight passage through the Strait of Dover.143 According to Plan FULLER, the degree
of combat readiness the bomber force was to maintain was left at the discretion
of CINC, Bomber Command.144
In its order, Fighter Command stated that the intention was to protect aircraft
of the Bomber and Coastal Commands while they attacked major enemy naval
units on passage between Cherbourg and a point south of the island of Walcheren. For Operation FULLER / MINOR FULLER, the plan was to concentrate fighter
squadrons in the Tangmere area, including squadrons from No. 12 Group. No.
11 Group wings at Tangmere, Biggin Hill (near London), and Kenley (in Surrey;
also near London) would be the first to be employed. Headquarters Fighter Command directed No. 10 Group to have a wing of three squadrons available; this
group would be used to reinforce the other groups.145
Plan FULLER also envisaged the employment of forces commanded by Vice
Admiral Dover (Vice Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay) and CINC Nore (Admiral Sir
George D’Oyly Lyon). Admiral Ramsay’s plan was to launch torpedo attacks using
Swordfish torpedo bombers and MTBs, aiming at damaging the enemy ships while
they were within the effective range of the Dover coastal batteries. The MTBs would
be employed without air cover but with the support of MGBs. However, Admiral
Ramsay did not envisage employing the MTBs for daylight attacks.146 These attacks
would be followed by attacks by the Harwich destroyers off the Belgian coast.147
The First Sea Lord, Admiral Dudley Pound, was firmly against employing
British heavy ships in the southern part of the North Sea, where they would be
exposed to enemy air and torpedo-boat attacks. They also would risk damage
from minefields, whether British or German.148
GERMAN PREPARATIONS
The Germans carried out a series of diverse preparatory measures. Among the
most important was preparing the heavy ships for sea and combat after their
long sojourn in the shipyard. To enhance the ships’ AA defenses, they were fitted with additional 20 mm and 37 mm AA guns. To reduce the danger of fire
aboard, the Brest Group ships left ashore the aircraft they normally embarked,
given that they did not need them for reconnaissance or air defense. All three
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heavy ships were fitted with additional radio transmitters to ensure continuous
communication with fighter aircraft.149
Security Forces West conducted minesweeping of the intended route and
provided navigational support, consisting of radio beacons and beacon boats and
the preparation of emergency ports.150 Clearing enemy mines from the transit
route to the greatest extent possible required minesweeping night after night.151
However, Security Forces West did not have sufficient forces to neutralize enemy
mines completely; that task could be carried out only if minesweepers from the
Baltic were redeployed to the Naval Group Command West area.152 In addition,
an unfavorable ice situation in the Baltic resulted in the M- and R-flotillas arriving late to their assigned bases in the Naval Group Command West area.153 In the
Strait of Dover, the Germans could use only R-flotillas, which were not as capable
as M-flotillas. Because of the threat from the air, the Germans were able to sweep
mines only during the night. Neutralizing mines that were fitted with contact
counters and delaying mechanisms was especially challenging.154
Naval Group Command North was responsible for clearing mines from convoy routes to the latitude of Texel, Netherlands, and the northern extension of the
route beyond Texel. It also was responsible for clearing the southeastern end of
the German-mined area, dubbed Sperre II (Barrier II), and part of Sperre I. During mine-clearing operations conducted from 17 January to 12 February, only
thirty-two enemy ground mines were found in the area off Hoek van Holland and
on the convoy route in the German Bight.155 At about 2130 on 25 January, during
the deployment of the 5th Destroyer Flotilla from Vlissingen to Brest, destroyer
Bruno Heinemann (Z 8) ran into two mines and sank.156 The 4th R-flotilla swept
mines westward from the Strait of Dover; the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th R-flotillas within
the strait; and the 1st and 5th M-flotillas eastward from the strait. Mine clearing
was conducted even in bad weather, with wind strengths up to force 9 (out of
10) on the Beaufort scale. During the night of 11/12 February, the 1st M-flotilla
cleared a new minefield at the latitude of Berck-sur-Mer. It took only four boats
to clear a gap in the minefield.157
To conceal the true objective of the minesweeping from the enemy, German
agents spread the word that the activity constituted merely routine removal of
enemy mines. They also suggested that the Germans had laid a mine barrier that
needed checking. The deployment of the 5th Destroyer Flotilla to Brest to escort
the heavy ships also was linked to this minesweeping.158
The forces assigned to escort the Brest Group started to assemble at Brest during the last week of January. On 25 January, the 2nd T-flotilla, with five boats,
arrived; the next day, the 5th T-flotilla did so. On 28 January, the 5th Destroyer
Flotilla (Richard Beitzen [Z 4] and Paul Jacobi [Z 5]) also arrived. However, two
destroyers (Z-29 and Friedrich Ihn [Z 14]) required three to four days of exercises
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in the Western Area before they were ready for combat. In the evening on 8 February, one destroyer (Z-25) and two torpedo boats (Kondor and Jaguar) moved
from Vlissingen to Le Havre; the 2nd T-flotilla (five boats) from Brest to Le Havre;
the 3rd T-flotilla from Rotterdam to Dunkirk; two S-boats (S-51 and S-69) from
Ostend to Dunkirk; and two other S-boats (S-39 and S-103) from IJmuiden to Boulogne. On 9 February, two torpedo boats (T-15 and T-17) arrived in Dunkirk.159
The 3rd Air Fleet rehearsed its plan for providing air cover to the Brest Group
during the first days of February 1942. Luftwaffe aircraft flew 450 sorties under
simulated combat conditions; these flights apparently did not cause any suspicion
on the British side.160 At a 5 February meeting at the headquarters of Naval Group
Command West, the chief of staff of the 3rd Air Fleet stated that on A-day (12
February) fighters and heavy fighters would fly at low altitude to reduce the possibility of detection until the moment of contact with the enemy.161
Jamming of the enemy radars in the Strait of Dover area would be conducted
pursuant to the Naval Group Command West proposal. The 3rd Air Fleet would use
stations in the Cherbourg area to conduct jamming during the morning of A-day.
This would support the Luftwaffe’s IX Air Corps’s attacks on the English coast.162
From the beginning of February 1942, General Wolfgang Martini, the director of Luftwaffe communications, conducted experiments with a new method of
jamming British radars. He ordered the jamming of British coastal stations each
day at dawn. In the days leading up to the execution of Operation CERBERUS,
through 11 February, the duration of the jamming was increased gradually. The
British did not believe the interference was caused by systematic actions—German jamming—but instead that it resulted from atmospheric disturbances. This
cleverly executed plan was largely responsible for the delays in the British attacks.163 The Germans also jammed the radars of British aircraft.164
All the Luftwaffe actions in support of the fleet forces had to be approved by
Reichsmarschall Göring. The 3rd Air Fleet also insisted that it must have clear
orders about when and on whose orders the operation was to be terminated.165
BRITISH PREPARATIONS
The British preparations for preventing any attempt by the Germans to move
their heavy ships from Brest through the Channel included reevaluation of existing plans. On 8 February 1942, the Admiralty and Coastal Command conducted
a new appreciation of the situation. Other preparations included increasing the
combat readiness of various forces and extensive mining of enemy waters in the
Channel and the southern part of the North Sea.166
On 3 February, CINC Nore was directed to arrange for six destroyers with torpedoes to be in the Thames estuary on six hours’ notice, to operate under the orders of Vice Admiral Dover. Six MTBs also would be in readiness. Six Swordfishes
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were flown from Lee-on-Solent to Manston. One fast minelayer was placed under
Vice Admiral Dover and another under CINC Plymouth. The submarine HMS
Sealion was directed to join two other submarines already off Brest.167
Coastal Command organized three night patrols: (1) Stopper—off the Brest
entrance; (2) Line S.E.—between Ushant and Île de Bréhat; and (3) HABO—between Le Havre and Boulogne. All patrols were flown using ASV radar–fitted
Hudsons; theoretically they were capable of detecting a large ship at a range of
about thirty miles.168 Of three Coastal Command torpedo-bomber squadrons,
one was at Leuchars, in Scotland; it was tasked with conducting attacks on the
battleship Tirpitz. Another squadron was based at Saint Eval, in Cornwall; it covered the Bay of Biscay, and was put in readiness to conduct night attacks should
the Brest Group move up the Channel.169
On 4 February, the Admiralty sent a message to the Air Ministry to execute
Plan FULLER. Both services put their forces into a state of immediate readiness.170
Also on 4 February, Fighter Command directed No. 11 Group to coordinate
actions by its fighters and instructed No. 10 Group to operate according to its requests. On 8 February, Coastal Command directed the Beaufort torpedo-bomber
squadron at Leuchars to fly to Coltishall, Norfolk.171
From 4 to 9 February, all available bombers of Bomber Command were ordered to stand by each day as a striking force for the operation.172 However, on
6 February Air Vice-Marshal Jack Baldwin, the acting commander of Bomber
Command, asked the Air Ministry to be released from obligations under Plan
FULLER; he was told to ask the Admiralty, and on 7 February Baldwin sent his request there. Upon arrival, it reportedly caused “consternation” among naval planners.173 The Admiralty replied that the danger the German group represented increased as the tides became more favorable. After receiving the Admiralty’s reply,
Baldwin decided to assign two-thirds of his force to the bombing of Germany,
leaving only one hundred bombers for Plan FULLER. However, their state of readiness was increased to only four hours’ notice.174
On 5 February, an important convoy bound for the Middle East, dubbed
WS16, was formed up in the Clyde, to sail out on 16 February. British prime
minister Winston S. Churchill and Admiral Pound were concerned that the Brest
Group might attack that convoy as it passed down into the Bay of Biscay. Hence,
Pound sent the following message to CINC Home Fleet: “Possibility of Brest
ships coming out appreciated but sailing of W.S. 16 cannot be deferred. Request
you sail [battleship] Rodney to arrive to Clyde A./M. on February 15.” He also
sent a message to the commander of Force H: “As German battle cruisers may be
tempted to operate in Atlantic, Force H is to proceed to Clyde to arrive not later
than February 15. Object is to give protection to W.S. 16, which will sail under the
command of Admiral Sir James Somerville in [carrier] Formidable.”175
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Between 3 and 9 February, two 2,650-ton, thirty-nine-knot Abdiel-class minelayers (Manxman and Welshman), each capable of carrying some 160 mines,
laid about a thousand moored contact and magnetic mines in six fields between
Ushant and Boulogne, partly in deep water.176 One 820-ton coastal minelayer
(Plover), with a capacity of a hundred mines, laid moored magnetic mines in
deep water between Dover and Cap Gris-Nez and in the area where the British
believed the Germans would not conduct minesweeping.177 Bomber Command
laid sixteen fields of moored mines and 1,100 ground (magnetic influence) mines
off Terschelling.178 This area was selected because the enemy ships were bound
to pass by if they used the shortest route to home waters. The mines were laid in
deep water; the British believed the Germans might consider this area to remain
unmined, and hence would not waste time sweeping it.179
EXECUTION
The Germans started Operation CERBERUS as planned. On 11 February (X–1),
all the ships of the Brest Group still were camouflaged, but their aircraft were
on the pier so the French shipyard workers could see them. At 2030, Admiral
Ciliax issued an order to be ready for sailing out.180 On the same day, the Germans
recorded some sixty-seven enemy flights in the area of western France, with the
Schwerpunkt on Brest. Some thirty British bombers attacked Brest from 2035 to
2127. At 2040, Ciliax issued an air raid alert. This raid caused a planned delay in
the Brest Group sailing out until 2200.181
Finally, at 2245 on 11 February, the Brest Group, accompanied by six destroyers and three torpedo boats, sailed out from Brest (see map 1). The two-hour
delay in departure caused by the enemy air attack required the minesweeping
groups along the route to adjust their timetables.182 On the night of 11/12 February, full darkness lasted about twelve hours. This would have been sufficient to
transit only 360 nautical miles at a speed of thirty knots; nonetheless, the delay
in sailing out did not create a great problem, because the favorable tidal current
added to the ships’ speed over the ground.183
Admiral Ciliax intended to return to Brest if enemy aircraft or submarines observed his ships shortly after leaving port.184 Yet, for a variety of reasons—mostly
the malfunctioning of their radars—none of the enemy air patrols observed that
the Brest Group had left its harbor. In particular, Coastal Command’s reconnaissance aircraft on the western (Stopper) and central (Line S.E.) night patrols failed
to detect the Brest Group.185 Initially, the Brest Group sailed at seventeen knots
to Point 30a. At 0013 on 12 February (X-day), it increased speed to twenty-seven
knots. Ushant (Point Rosa 30) was passed at 0112.186
During the night of 11/12 February, winds were light and visibility was
very good, owing to a high-pressure area over the western part of the English
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Channel.187 The sea surface was smooth, with a light swell.188 The initial weather
forecast for 12 February was favorable for the Brest Group and the Luftwaffe’s
aircraft; nice weather, with a stiff breeze, would prevail in the English Channel in
the morning. However, after midday the wind would drop and the weather would
deteriorate gradually. This probably would result in low clouds and reduced visibility just as the Brest Group approached the Strait of Dover.189
By 0200, the Brest Group had passed the latitude of Ushant.190 At 0212, Admiral Ciliax informed the ships’ crews—for the first time—about the true purpose
of the operation. The Brest Group was screened by five destroyers and the 5th
T-flotilla, led by Commodore Bey.191 By the early morning of 12 February, winds
had increased out of the southwest, ahead of an approaching warm front (see
map 2).192 The weather was characterized by broken clouds, good visibility, and
a moderate sea state.193
At about 0530, the 1st M-flotilla discovered the newly sown enemy mines
some twenty nautical miles southwest of Boulogne; at the time, the Brest Group
was some five and a half hours away from that position.194 The area on both sides
of the swept channel had not been examined in recent months.195 One option was
for the Brest Group to avoid the newly discovered mined area; however, Commodore Ruge believed that an avoidance route would run the group over shallow
water, which was unsafe for the battleships. Hence, he directed the 1st M-flotilla
to return at 0700 to create a gap in the mine barrier.196 The Brest Group reached
the latitude of Cherbourg at 0615, and thereafter was joined by the 2nd and 3rd
T-flotillas and the 4th S-boat Flotilla.197 Up to that time, the Brest Group had
made good time, moving at thirty knots through the water, plus two more knots
over the ground resulting from the following tidal current.198
By the morning of X-day, the Brest Group was too far to the west for the RAF’s
eastern patrol (HABO) to sight it before the search was completed. The agreement between Commander, No. 11 Fighter Group, and Vice Admiral Dover
envisaged sending fighter aircraft from Hawkinge (near Folkestone) shortly after
dawn each morning to conduct early reconnaissance of the area between Ostend
and the Somme estuary (called the “Jim Crow” patrol). On the morning of 12
February, the British sent two Spitfires to patrol the area off the French coast
north of Le Havre; one of them patrolled the area off Boulogne. This aircraft
sighted enemy E-boats leaving the harbor, heading south; these E-boats were
joined off Berck-sur-Mer by another. Because of the radio silence ordered, this
aircraft returned to its base to report its observation. The second Spitfire fighter
reconnoitered the area between Cap Gris-Nez and Ostend. It reported the presence of eleven small vessels off Ostend and six similar vessels off Zeebrugge.199
During the morning and early forenoon hours of 12 February, the Germans
conducted extensive jamming of the enemy coastal radar chain. In addition, two
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Heinkel (He) 111 bombers fitted with jammers flew in the early morning parallel
to the southern English coast, including south of the Isle of Wight. Fighter Command sent a large number of fighters against what it presumed to be a squadron
of Luftwaffe aircraft. (A German jammer fitted on a single plane could simulate
the presence of twenty-five aircraft.) At the same time, one squadron of Junkers
(Ju) 88s carried out a relief attack against the port of Plymouth, flying undisturbed and suffering no losses.200
By 0800, the Brest Group already had been at sea some ten hours. Owing to the
strong following current, it had recovered most of the time lost initially. When
twenty-four boats joined the group at the latitude of Cap Gris-Nez, the size of
the screening force increased to almost sixty.201 Because of the need to maintain
radio silence, not until 0816 did Ciliax send a short signal about the position of
his group.202 At about 0842, the Messerschmidt (Me) 110 heavy (night) fighters
based at Abbeville started to provide air cover for the Brest Group. The German
torpedo boats and destroyers formed the outer protective screen for the group.203
After 0930, the air escort of the Brest Group shifted to Me-109 fighters, with
thirty the average number of aircraft at a time.204 By 1000, the Brest Group had
been joined by the 2nd and 3rd T-flotillas.205 By then it was only fifteen minutes
behind schedule.206
THE BREST GROUP IS DETECTED
At about 1030, a British air patrol off Le Touquet sighted some twenty to thirty
enemy ships sailing in a convoy—the Brest Group. This information was passed
immediately to Vice Admiral Dover and No. 11 Group. The patrol aircraft landed
at 1050. Another patrol aircraft identified Scharnhorst and Gneisenau at 1042.207
At 1105, the Brest Group was joined by the 4th S-boat Flotilla.208 Between 1126
and 1147, the Brest Group, sailing in a line column at a speed of only ten knots,
followed the 1st M-flotilla through the gap in the enemy mine barrier the flotilla
had cleared early that morning.209
BRITISH ATTACKS
After the Brest Group was detected, the British reacted quickly, executing Plan
FULLER. They mounted attacks with torpedo bombers of the FAA and Coastal
Command, MTBs, destroyers, the Dover coastal batteries, and heavy bombers of
Bomber Command (see map 3). None of these attacks scored any hit on the ships
of the Brest Group or its screening forces.
The major commanders on the British side were more concerned to “delay the
enemy in any way possible by immediate attack with any force available than to
risk losing the opportunity in the effort to arrange coordinated attacks.” Failure
to detect the Brest Group in a timely fashion was largely responsible for the lack

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2021

37

0º

30’
1º

1100
1055

Vergoyer 1105

Bassurelle

The Ridge

1135
1125

1045/12

1205

30’

1200
1155
1150
1146
1140

The Varne

Goodwin
Sands

Kentish
Knock

3
2
2

n BRITISH
ge

1

1312

1318

6
6

2

5

3

Étaples-sur-Mer

Boulogne

Cap Gris-Nez

Calais
Cap Blanc-Nez

2º

1430

Dyck
3
4

5

West Hinder

FRANCE

30’

Thornton
Ridge

1445
estimated

Source: “The Passage of the Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Prinz Eugen through the English Channel, 12th February, 1942,” Battle Summary No. 11, ADM 234/328, UKNA, plan 1.

3º E

Ostend

MINEFIELD

1400
estimated BRITISH

SCHARNHORST
RUNS ON MINE, 1430

ATTACKS BY
RAF

BRITISH
MINEFIELD

1455
Attacked by
aircraft

Destroyer patrol
established 13 Feb. 0645

n
1240
yti MINEFIELD
1235
Ru
ter
1230
Ou
1225
en
ATTACK
1220
ofd a
BY 5 MTBs
Ho Are
FROM DOVER
Dunkirk
1215
1210

ATTACK BY
SWORDFISH
ié
AIRCRAFT
ett
nd 1305
Sa 1300
1255
1250
1245

CONTACT WITH THE
ENEMY DESTROYER
SCREEN BY 3 MTBs
FROM RAMSGATE

Intended position
of destroyer
attacks

BRITISH
MINEFIELD

BRITISH DESTROYERS
MINE
BARRIER

MINE
BARRIER

Nº 53

1318/12 Feb.

Shipwash

9 4

1517
3

30’

Scheldt R.

30’

51ºN

30’

EST
U
MEUARY OF
SE R THE
IVER

WALCHEREN

3

1545

1543
52º
Destroyer 1555
attack 1550

VEGO

Source: Plan 1, Battle Summaries, No. 11: Passage of the “Scharnhorst,” “Gneisenau,” and “Prinz Eugen,” through the English Channel, 12th February 1942, ADM 234/328, National Archives, Kew Gardens, Richmond, London.

Beachy Head

Eastbourne

Hastings

ss

gen
e

Dun

Folkestone

Dover

36 ROUNDS
FIRED BY
DOVER
COASTAL BATTERY
1210 TO 1245

North Foreland
Ramsgate
Swingate

eet

nfl

Gu

Harwich

d

MINED
AREA

Map 3: BRITISH ATTACKS ON THE BREST GROUP, 12 FEBRUARY 1942

ENGLAND

Gravesend

LONDON

Fa

nk

MAP 3
BRITISH ATTACKS ON THE BREST GROUP, 12 FEBRUARY 1942

DF
)

irli
gh
t (R

Su

B

an
gS
Lo
n

P

OU
GR

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol74/iss3/7
RE
ST

Naval War College Review, Vol. 74 [2021], No. 3, Art. 7
137

38

138

Vego:
NAVARedeployment
L WA R C O L L E G E Rof
E V Ithe
E W German Brest Group through the English Channe

of proper coordination among the attacks by various forces in the early stages of
the operation, whereas any reasonable prospect of success depended greatly on
having a coordinated plan for the employment of the aircraft available.210
Fleet Air Arm Attacks
The FAA had available only six old biplane Swordfish torpedo bombers (see
sidebar).211 Instructions for them to attack were received at 1130. The squadron
was to take off at 1220 and carry out its attack at about 1245.212 Coastal Command did try to coordinate the attacks by the Swordfishes with those by its more
capable Beaufort torpedo bombers; however, for some reason Admiral Ramsay
decided to use the Swordfishes independently.
The FAA appreciated fully the need for strong fighter protection. It had been
arranged that No. 11 Fighter Group would assign three squadrons (the Biggin
Hill Wing) to provide air cover and two squadrons (the Hornchurch Wing) to
escort the Swordfishes. The plan was to assemble the Swordfishes and fighters at
Manston (on the Isle of Thanet, in northeast Kent) at about 1225. However, because
of unforeseen events, that was not possible; only one fighter squadron arrived at
Manston on time, while the other two squadrons proceeded directly to the target
area. Nonetheless, the commander of the Swordfish squadron decided to take off
as planned at 1225, with his aircraft protected by only one squadron of Spitfires.
The Swordfishes proceeded in two flights of three. They located the enemy
ships some ten miles north of Calais. The Swordfishes flew at about eighty miles
per hour (mph), while the Spitfires were capable of 250 mph; hence it was difficult for the Spitfires to escort the Swordfishes. The Swordfishes fired their torpedoes at the enemy heavy ships but scored no hits. The enemy shot down all six
Swordfishes.213
Motor Torpedo Boat Attacks
The MTBs from Dover cleared the port at 1135 and sighted the enemy at 1223.
One MTB had engine trouble and fell astern, leaving four. They had no close escort from either fighters or MGBs (the latter cleared harbor some twenty minutes
after the MTBs). These four MTBs fired their torpedoes at the battle cruisers at
distances of four to five thousand yards.214 One MTB fired its torpedoes at Prinz
Eugen at a distance of about three thousand yards.215 All the torpedoes missed
their intended targets.
Three MTBs from Ramsgate cleared port at 1225.216 At 1215, the Brest Group
passed between Dover and Calais.217 At 1318, the MTBs sighted the enemy destroyers and S-boats. Their intent was to penetrate the enemy screen, then fire
their torpedoes. From 1320 to 1400, the German screening forces, primarily two
destroyers (Friedrich Ihn and Hermann Schoemann [Z 7]), engaged in combat
with the enemy MTBs.218 However, at about 1400 the commander of the British
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BRITISH ORDER OF BATTLE FOR OPERATION FULLER
ROYAL NAVY
First Sea Lord, Admiralty; Chief of Naval Staff
(Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, London)

NORE COMMAND
(Admiral Sir George D’Oyly Lyon, Chatham)

Destroyers
16th Destroyer Flotilla
(Captain J. P. Wright, Harwich)
3 destroyers: Mackay, Whitshed, Walpole
21st Destroyer Flotilla
(Captain C. T. M. Pizey, Harwich)
3 destroyers: Campbell, Vivacious, Worcester

DOVER COMMAND
(Vice Admiral Bertram Ramsay, Dover)
8 MTBs
Dover MTB Flotilla
(Lt. Cdr. E. N. Pumphrey)
5 MTBs: Nos. 44, 45, 48, 219, 221
Ramsgate MTB Flotilla
(Lieutenant D. J. Long)
3 MTBs: Nos. 18, 32, 71
Dover
(Lieutenant P. F. S. Gould)
2 MGBs: Nos. 41, 43

FLEET AIR ARM
(Rear Admiral Clement Moody, Lee-on-Solent)
No. 825 Squadron: 6 Swordfishes

ROYAL AIR FORCE
Chief of the Air Staff
(Air Chief Marshal Charles Frederick Algernon Portal,
London)

BOMBER COMMAND
(Air Vice-Marshal Jack Baldwin, High Wycombe)
310 bombers operational, 240 bombers available
No. 3 Group (Exning, Suffolk)
No. 4 Group (Heslington Hall, York)
No. 5 Group (Morton Hall, Swinderby)

FIGHTER COMMAND
(General Trafford Leigh-Mallory, Stanmore)
550–600 fighters operational, in 34 squadrons (398
available)
No. 10 Group (Bentley Priory, Stanmore)
No. 11 Group (Hillingdon House, Uxbridge)
No. 12 Group (Watnall)

COASTAL COMMAND
(General Philip Joubert de la Ferté, Northwood)
40/31 Beauforts (number operational / number available)
No. 42 Leuchars (Scotland) (14/14)
No. 86 Saint Eval (Cornwall) (13/11)
No. 217 Saint Eval / Thorney Island (near Portsmouth)
(13/6)
607 Squadron (Manston): Hurricane fighter-bombers
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Sources: Admiralty and Air Ministry, Report of the Board of
Enquiry, pp. 9, 12, 15; “Naval Forces Engaged in Operations
against the Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Prinz Eugen, 12th
February, 1942,” app. A in “The Passage of the Scharnhorst,
Gneisenau and Prinz Eugen through the English Channel,
12th February, 1942,” Battle Summary No. 11, ADM 234/328,
UKNA, pp. 15, 20; Roskill, The Period of Balance, map 15.
Note: Particulars given in this sidebar are based on the sources
listed here. They may not align exactly with the particulars given
in the text, as that information is based on British and German
intelligence sources. The former reflects what we know now; the
latter reflects what the combatants thought they knew then.

attackers realized that the enemy screen actually was sailing astern of the heavyship squadron. Then the weather deteriorated and the MTBs returned to port
without launching their torpedoes.219
The German 3rd Air Fleet’s IX Air Corps operated west of the Isle of Wight.
Until 1315 its aircraft conducted reconnaissance and surveillance flights, partly
to protect the S-boats.220
Fires by Coastal Batteries
At 1318, the Margate batteries at Cliff, near Dover, opened fire on the Brest
Group.221 However, by 1333 the enemy ships were out of range, and at 1345 the
batteries ceased firing, having expended thirty-six nine-inch rounds.222 No hits
were scored.223
At 1330, the German batteries in the Calais area opened fire on the British
batteries.224 Battery Siegfried fired six 380 mm rounds, while Battery 1/725 fired
twelve 280 mm rounds.225
Destroyer Attacks
By coincidence, all six of the Harwich destroyers were exercising at sea when
the Brest Group first was detected. At 1156, a message sent to the commander of
the squadron directed it to proceed to attack, in two divisions. At 1300, Admiral
Ramsay informed the squadron commander that the enemy battle cruisers were
sailing at a higher speed than the twenty knots initially believed; therefore, the
only way to intercept the enemy off the Meuse River estuary was to cross the
mine barrier. At 1335, a lone Ju-88 sighted the three 16th Flotilla destroyers and
attacked them with bombs. At 1400, the destroyers passed beyond range of the
RDF station at Dover. Further reports on the enemy ships were received at the
Area Combined Headquarters at Chatham. With the Admiralty’s concurrence,
control of the destroyers was transferred to CINC Nore. At 1517, just when the
21st Destroyer Flotilla of three destroyers, also from Harwich, was directed to
turn to the southwest if the enemy ships had not been detected, visibility diminished from seven to four miles.
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At 1543, the 16th Destroyer Flotilla sighted the enemy ships at a distance of
four miles. The flotilla came under heavy fire from the enemy battleships and
escorting destroyers. One British destroyer fired a torpedo at the German ships
at a range of four thousand yards; another fired from three thousand. Four
minutes later, two British destroyers fired torpedoes at a range of 2,400 yards.226
The attack the British destroyers made was a very risky one. British bombers
were supposed to support the ships but never located them.227 It was lucky that
only one destroyer was damaged, albeit severely, and that it was able to return
safely to Harwich.228
Coastal Command Attacks
On the morning of 12 February, Coastal Command had in service thirty-six
Beaufort torpedo bombers; the seven on Thorney Island were the nearest to the
Brest Group, and AOC-CINC of Coastal Command decided that they would
carry out early attacks. Four Beauforts were in an advanced stage of readiness and
were supposed to fly to Manston and join the fighters, but they arrived too late.
Two Beauforts of the original formation of four landed at Manston at 1445. They
received information on the targets, then flew off on the attack. The weather was
bad, however, with rain and low visibility.229
At 1540, the aircraft dropped torpedoes from a distance of about one thousand yards at what pilots believed to be the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen. A second
formation of four Beauforts was ordered to proceed to Manston and then to the
target. They circled above Manston at 1500 and then set off for the target. Because
of the bad visibility they decided to carry out their attacks singly. Enemy fighters
attacked them and they encountered heavy AA fires from the ships. One Beaufort
was shot down; two other machines dropped their torpedoes but were unable to
observe the results.230
Between 0900 and 0915 on 12 February, fourteen serviceable Beauforts took
off from Leuchars. Because three aircraft did not have torpedoes, the entire
squadron was directed to fly to the station at North Coates (south of Hull)
to get torpedoes. However, that airfield was rendered unserviceable by heavy
snowfall.231 The same situation prevailed at Bircham Newton, where the squadron next was directed to land. Finally, the squadron was diverted to the fighter
base at Coltishall (in East Anglia), where it landed at about 1145 on 12 February. However, the torpedoes would have had to be brought from North Coates
to Coltishall, and that was not done.232 Because of engine problems with two
other aircraft, only nine out of fourteen Beauforts took off from Coltishall. The
squadron was directed to proceed to Manston to accompany five Hudson heavy
bombers. It landed at 1453 at Manston, then at 1534 took off with the Hudsons
and flew toward the target area.233
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Despite poor visibility, the Beauforts sighted enemy ships at 1604. Six Beauforts attacked and dropped seven torpedoes; the results were not observed, because of heavy enemy AA fire.234 Another twelve Beauforts sighted small craft but
failed to locate the main targets. Thirteen or fourteen torpedoes were dropped,
but the results were not observed.235
In the meantime, at 1220, all twelve Beauforts based at Saint Eval were directed
to fly to Thorney Island, and landed there at 1430. Fifteen minutes later, the detachment was ordered to take off and to join with the fighter escort at Coltishall
by 1700. As planned, all twelve aircraft arrived over Coltishall, but they found no
friendly fighters. The leader then decided to fly toward the enemy ships. By 1741,
the detachment was over the estimated position of the enemy ships, but visibility
was only a few hundred yards, it was raining, and darkness was near. Any chance
of carrying out a successful attack had vanished. The detachment returned to its
home base, but two machines were lost.236
Bomber Command Attacks
At 1127, Bomber Command received a report of detection of the Brest Group.
Only five minutes later, the Air Ministry informed all three subordinate major
commands that Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had been observed some sixteen
miles west of Le Touquet at 1105. Unusual enemy air activity also was reported.
A decision was made to use maximum force as early as possible to destroy the
enemy ships and aircraft—this “unique opportunity [was] to be exploited to the
utmost.”237 There were 310 bombers on the comprehensive list, but only some 240
were operationally available.238 These included one hundred bombers kept at four
hours’ readiness under Plan FULLER.239
At 1420, the first wave of seventy-three bombers drawn from all over the
country was sent to attack the enemy ships. No attempt was made to combine
this force into a single formation; instead, pilots headed out to sea toward the
enemy singly or in pairs, and all bombers attacked their targets individually.
First, general cover by fighters over the area was established. The first bombers
arrived over the target at about 1445, and attacks lasted until 1558. Scharnhorst
was sailing some thirty miles astern of the main formation. The weather in the
area was cloudy, with a ceiling at no more than two thousand feet but sometimes as low as seven hundred feet. The visibility was no more than one mile.
Overall, the weather conditions were very unfavorable for bombing.240
A second wave of some 134 bombers arrived at 1600 over the targets, in a
scattered formation owing to deterioration in the weather; the clouds had closed
and formed a solid overcast, it was raining, and visibility was less than 330 feet.
Even so, the weather over the French coast was sufficiently favorable to enable
German fighters to take off and land. The German fighters encountered the British bombers as the latter descended from the clouds to eyeball their targets, and
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shot down many of them. Together, the fighters and the AA defenses of the Brest
Group and its escorts prevented the enemy bombers from scoring any hits. These
encounters lasted until 1706.241
From about 1600 to 1900, the weather became more favorable for the attackers. Fighter protection of the Brest Group became even more difficult. Horizontal
visibility still was only 1.1–3.4 miles. Vertical visibility averaged 660 feet, facilitating British bomber attacks from the clouds at altitudes from 490 to 985 feet.242
At 1615, a third wave of thirty-five British bombers took off; at about 1750 they
reached their targets; at 1815 the last of them attacked, in darkness, rain, and
mist. No bomber of the third wave scored a hit either.243
In the meantime, at 1521 the Brest Group crossed the boundary between the
Naval Group Command West and Naval Group Command North areas (see
map 1). At 1531, Scharnhorst reported that it had run onto a ground mine.244
The ship took on a thousand tons of water and its port engine broke down.245
Admiral Ciliax shifted his flag to the destroyer Z-29.246 The Brest Group formation was broken up.247
At about 1745, an engine breakdown on Z-29 forced Admiral Ciliax to shift his
flag again, this time to the destroyer Hermann Schoemann. By then Scharnhorst
reported that it was making twenty-seven knots, despite its damage. At 2055,
the ships of the Brest Group suffered another mishap when Gneisenau ran into
a mine. The device ripped the ship’s bottom and damaged the propeller shaft.248
However, Gneisenau still was able to proceed at fifteen knots.249
At 2234, Scharnhorst reported hitting a second ground mine, off the Frisian
Islands.250 The ship was forced to stop, but some thirty minutes later was under
way again.251 After a consultation with SKL, it was decided that Gneisenau would
proceed via the Elbe to Kiel and Scharnhorst to Wilhelmshaven.252 At 2400,
Scharnhorst was traveling at twelve knots. Scharnhorst, Hermann Schoemann, and
later Z-29, plus several torpedo boats, sailed toward Jade, while Gneisenau and
Prinz Eugen headed to the Elbe River estuary and then to Brunsbüttel. The light
forces sailed to Heligoland.253
From 0157 to 0346 on 13 February, six British bombers flew into the German
Bight and over the waters off Jade, the Elbe estuary, and Heligoland. Their apparent intent was to prevent the German ships from entering the Elbe. However,
all their efforts to inflict significant damages on the Brest Group failed. After
Scharnhorst arrived at Wilhelmshaven at about 1250, Admiral Ciliax reported the
completion of Operation CERBERUS.254
RESULTS
The 3rd Air Fleet reported that a total of 406 aircraft (27 Me-110s, 125 Focke-Wulf
Fw-190s, and 254 Me-109s) were employed in support of the Brest Group on 12
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February.255 This was a much larger number of aircraft than the 250 machines
that were envisaged initially. Initial reports showed some seventy fighters missing; however, many of these landed at airfields in the Netherlands instead of their
home bases owing to the weather. Many fighters suffered greater damage while
landing than in combat.256 The German fighter losses in combat were given as only
seven fighters (four Bf-109s and three Me-109s).257 In addition, two bombers (one
Dornier 217 and one Ju-88) crashed on return to Germany. The Germans claimed
with certainty that their fighters had shot down twenty-six enemy aircraft (five
Spitfires, four Whirlwinds, six Swordfishes, four Hampdens, three Blenheims, two
Wellingtons, one Whitley, and one Hurricane), and probably had shot down thirteen others; in addition, AA defenses had shot down twenty-three enemy aircraft.258
Over some three-plus hours, 242 RAF bombers took off and attacked the
Brest Group, but the German fighters kept most of them away from their targets;
only thirty-eight British bombers sighted the enemy ships. Some bombers found
the ships initially but in trying to gain altitude lost them again. However, twelve
bombers were able to lay mines off the Elbe River estuary. Some fifteen bombers
were lost, and another crashed while landing at its base.259
On paper, Fighter Command had thirty-four fighter squadrons with 550–600
machines, but only 398 were available for combat and were employed, of which
102 carried out attacks on various naval vessels.260 Some twenty-one Spitfire
squadrons took part in the action, plus some Hurricanes.261
The British claimed that their fighters had shot down sixteen enemy fighters,
probably destroyed three more, and damaged seventeen. Two enemy torpedo
boats (Jaguar and T-3) were damaged by bombs. The British aircraft also sank
one six-hundred-ton vessel and one E-boat, while eight enemy escort vessels were
damaged. The British lost all six Swordfish torpedo bombers, one destroyer was
damaged heavily, and one MTB was cut to shreds. In these efforts, some thirteen
FAA officers and men were killed, and forty-three others suffered injuries.262
EPILOGUE
In the aftermath of Operation CERBERUS, the German plan was for both battleships and the heavy cruiser to deploy to Norway to be used to attack enemy
convoys to Soviet Russia. However, their deployments were delayed repeatedly
because of a series of accidents.
Scharnhorst was deployed initially to the Baltic to bring the ship up to a state
of combat readiness. However, in an exercise in early August 1942 the ship collided with a U-boat and suffered damages, which were repaired in September.
Then engine troubles kept Scharnhorst in home waters until early January 1943.
The ship’s planned deployment to Norway, in company with Prinz Eugen and five
destroyers, was aborted on 7 January because of the threat of British bombers.
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On 8 March, when poor weather grounded the enemy bombers, another attempt
was made, and Scharnhorst reached Bogen, near Narvik, on 14 March. But during its stay in Norway Scharnhorst suffered damage from an internal explosion
that required major repairs. Then lack of fuel prevented Scharnhorst from being
used in combat. Its first renewed action took place on 8 September 1943, when
it accompanied Tirpitz and ten destroyers in bombarding enemy (Norwegian)
coastal batteries, fuel tanks, and harbor facilities on Spitsbergen (Operation
ZITRONELLA). In its last action, Scharnhorst, accompanied by five destroyers, was
sunk in the battle of the North Cape on 26 December 1943; only thirty-six out of
the crew of nearly two thousand survived.263
Gneisenau never reached Norway. The repairs of the damages caused by the
mine on 12 February were completed on 26 February. However, during the night
of 26/27 February the ship was damaged heavily by bombs in a British air raid
on Kiel. Gneisenau was towed to Gotenhafen (Gdynia, Poland, today) on 2 April
1942, but the necessary repairs would have been so extensive that they never
were completed. Gneisenau was decommissioned on 1 July 1942 and scuttled at
Gotenhafen’s entrance on 23 March 1945.264
The heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen also had an unhappy subsequent history.
In the aftermath of Operation CERBERUS, on 21 February 1942, together with
the heavy cruiser Admiral Scheer and five destroyers, Prinz Eugen sailed for
Trondheim, Norway. Only two days later it was torpedoed by a British submarine. The ship was able to limp back to Kiel on 16 May, where it remained in
dry dock until October 1942. Thereafter to the end of war it operated in home
waters. It served as a training/experimental ship until June 1944, then was returned to combat service, used to support German troops on the Baltic coast.
On 15 October 1944, it collided with the light cruiser Leipzig. Repairs were
completed within a month. On 20–21 November 1944, Prinz Eugen bombarded
Soviet positions on the Sworbe Peninsula (Sõrve Peninsula, Estonia, today).
In mid-January 1945, it bombarded Soviet troops on the Samland Peninsula,
Königsberg (Kaliningrad, Russia, today). In March, Prinz Eugen again was in
action, firing on Soviet positions at Gotenhafen, Hela (Hel, Poland, today),
and Danzig (Gdańsk, Poland, today). Prinz Eugen sailed from Swinemünde
(Świnoujście, Poland, today) to Copenhagen, Denmark, in April 1945. After
the end of the war, it was awarded as a prize to the United States; the U.S. Navy
commissioned it as Prinz Eugen (IX 300). In January 1946, it sailed to Boston
and then to the Pacific. It served as a target ship in the atomic bomb tests at
Bikini Atoll in July 1946 (Operation CROSSROADS). It survived two such tests;
although heavily damaged, unlike other target ships it remained afloat. It finally
sank in December 1946.265
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CONCLUSION AND OPERATIONAL LESSONS LEARNED
The redeployment of the two German battleships and one heavy cruiser from
Brest to home waters was planned meticulously and executed almost flawlessly.
Despite damages inflicted by mines, both battleships reached their ports in the
German Bight. The British did not detect the sorties of the Brest Group in a
timely fashion nor the group’s subsequent movement through the Channel until
too late. In contrast, British planning was highly fragmented, as were British attacks on the Brest Group. Hence, it hardly was a surprise that the British naval
and air forces failed to destroy, or even to inflict heavy damage on, the Brest
Group.
The German Kriegsmarine was highly centralized but not necessarily soundly
organized. Although the fleet commander nominally was in charge of all surface
forces, the establishment of the naval group commands weakened his position
greatly; in effect, his responsibility as an operational commander was transferred
to the naval group commanders. The fleet commander’s ability to control his
forces effectively also was affected adversely because he and his staff were located
on board a battleship instead of ashore.
The German naval command organization at the operational level for Operation CERBERUS generally was sound. Admiral Saalwächter was a supported
operational commander, while Admiral Carls was a supporting commander.
Admiral Ciliax was an operational-tactical commander; in the operational chain
of command, he temporarily was subordinate to Admirals Saalwächter and Carls.
Field Marshal Sperrle, as the 3rd Air Fleet commander, was subordinate to the
CINC of the Luftwaffe, Reichsmarschall Göring, who had a strong tendency to
interfere with the responsibilities and authority of subordinate operational and
even tactical commanders. With the exception of the middle level of commanders,
the Luftwaffe generally was unwilling to cooperate closely with the Kriegsmarine;
however, with Operation CERBERUS the situation was different, because Hitler
demanded that the Luftwaffe provide full support to the navy. In contrast to common practice, the Luftwaffe’s high command assigned a single commander, Colonel Galland, to be in charge of all fighters assigned to provide air cover to the Brest
Group. This ensured full unity of command in the employment of fighter aircraft
in support of the Brest Group during the execution of the operation.
The Royal Navy also was highly centralized. The Admiralty and its First Sea
Lord had full command and control over subordinate commands. The highest
operational level of seagoing command was the Home Fleet. With the exception of the Western Approaches Command, all shore commands were of the
operational-tactical level. A major problem in planning and executing Plan
FULLER was the lack of a single joint operational commander.
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Experience shows that planning and executing a major naval/joint operation
require the appointment of a single operational commander entrusted with full
responsibility and full authority over all subordinate forces. The most-effective planning and execution are ensured by applying the concept of supported and supporting
operational commanders. Supporting commanders then are obligated to provide
full support to the supported operational commander.
During the fall and winter of 1941, Admiral Raeder met several times with
Hitler at the latter’s headquarters at Rastenburg to discuss the future employment of heavy surface ships in the war against Allied maritime commerce. Unlike
Raeder, Hitler was increasingly skeptical about the survivability of heavy ships in
the face of the enemy threat from the air. By late 1941, he decided that the remaining battleships and heavy cruisers had to be redeployed to Norway to counter
a possible enemy landing and to attack the enemy’s convoys to Soviet Russia.
Raeder agreed with Hitler about the need to shift the Kriegsmarine’s Schwerpunkt
to the northern area, yet he continued to insist that there was a future for the
employment of heavy ships in the Atlantic.
Raeder also had detailed exchanges of views with Admirals Saalwächter, Carls,
and Ciliax on the future of the Brest Group. (Apparently Admiral Schniewind,
the fleet commander, was not involved in these discussions.) In what was a
standard practice in the Kriegsmarine, Raeder and his three subordinate admirals each expressed their views on the situation in a memo. They all agreed
that a breakout of the group into the Atlantic followed by a transit through the
Iceland–Scotland passages was unfeasible; in contrast, a breakout through the
Channel had a greater chance of success, although it still was highly risky. All
four admirals were against Hitler’s idea that if the Brest Group could not transit
through the Channel the battleships should be disarmed and their guns used for
coastal defense; they presented these views to Hitler.
However, Hitler was determined that the Brest Group must be redeployed to
home waters and eventually moved to Norway. In his view, the risk of transit could
be reduced greatly by achieving surprise and by passing the Strait of Dover during
daylight hours. Despite Raeder’s strong opposition, Hitler on 10 January 1942 made
the final decision for a west-to-east transit by the Brest Group. Hitler also involved
himself deeply in the purely tactical aspects of the pending operation; normally, the
highest political-military leader should not be involved in such discussions.
The British possessed detailed and fairly accurate knowledge of the enemy’s
naval and air dispositions in the English Channel and its western and eastern
approaches. Their great advantage was a highly effective Admiralty OIC and
the ability to decode and read most of the enemy’s Enigma messages. Coastal
Command relied on photographic reconnaissance of Brest and its approaches to
observe the daily activities or movements of the ships of the Brest Group. The
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British also were able to have agents in the occupied part of France confirm the
results of their decoding and air reconnaissance.
Appreciations of the situation by the Admiralty and Coastal Command in
early February 1942 accurately foresaw that an enemy breakout from Brest was
imminent. Yet despite their extensive knowledge of the enemy’s dispositions, the
British did not have knowledge of the German plans for Operations CERBERUS
and DONNERKEIL. The question remained whether the Brest Group would try to
reach home waters through the Channel or via the Greenland–Iceland–Scotland
passages; they also considered that the German ships might sail through the
Strait of Gibraltar to reach Genoa, Italy.
German naval intelligence had few if any agents in England during the war;
B-Dienst was the main source of German intelligence both prior to and during
Operation CERBERUS. However, it was highly effective, and the Germans had
detailed and timely knowledge of the enemy’s naval and air order of battle in England and Scotland. In contrast, the Germans did not have sufficiently accurate
information on the coastal defenses in the area of Dover, and they greatly exaggerated the number of enemy torpedo boats in the Dover and Ramsgate areas.
Moreover, they did not know any details of the enemy plans.
Operational intelligence results from the proper fusion of tactical and strategic
intelligence. It is aimed at providing support to the planning and execution of a
major operation or campaign. Operational intelligence should be highly centralized
to ensure the most effective gathering, processing, and integration of all available
information. The best results are achieved by using diverse sources of information.
Overreliance on technical intelligence should be avoided; the decoding of enemy
messages can put one’s forces in great danger, because if the enemy learns or suspects
that the codes have been broken he can feed in false information.
The German plans for Operations CERBERUS and DONNERKEIL were based on
a relatively large number of both military and nonmilitary considerations. The
Germans were highly successful in their analysis of the impact of the weather
and selected hydrographic/oceanographic aspects of the situation on their plans
for the operation. Perhaps the most critical were selecting the month, day, and
time of sailing out from Brest; selecting the optimal time of the day for transiting through the most dangerous section of the route—the Strait of Dover; and
ensuring secrecy and surprise. The length of the night hours, the phase of the
moon, and the state of the tides and currents, plus the weather, were major factors in selecting the time frame for executing the operation. The time of sailing
out depended largely on the time selected for the transit of the Strait of Dover.
The German decision to transit the narrowest part of the English Channel during
daylight rather than at night was probably the single most important factor in
achieving surprise. Only in daylight was it possible for the Brest Group to enjoy

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2021

49

Naval War College Review, Vol. 74 [2021], No. 3, Art. 7

VEGO

149

effective air cover and the most-effective use of heavy guns and AA defenses
against attacks by enemy light forces and aircraft. The selected route had to run
over deep water and also beyond the effective range of enemy coastal radars. The
Germans conceived and coordinated many diverse measures and actions aimed
at deceiving the enemy prior to the start of operations. Jamming of the enemy
coastal radar stations was planned and executed.
A sound plan for a major naval/joint operation should be based on realistic and
detailed evaluation of the key aspects of the weather and hydrography/oceanography in the pending operating area. This is especially critical to the success of an operation in littoral waters. The effects of the duration of the night, the depths of water,
the strength and direction of the surface currents, and the tides / tidal currents on
the employment of one’s own forces and those of the enemy should be integrated fully
into the plan of the pending operation. The staff of the naval/maritime operational
commander should have a section composed of highly knowledgeable and experienced meteorologists and hydrographers/oceanographers to provide input to the
planning of a major naval/joint operation.
German planning was conducted using standard procedures for operations
such as CERBERUS. Admiral Saalwächter issued the operational instruction and
operation order. Thereafter, Admiral Ciliax issued more-detailed operation
orders for his group. Commodore Ruge was responsible for planning the employment of his security forces in support of the Brest Group. The 3rd Air Fleet
issued only an operation order. Naval and air plans were coordinated closely.
Admiral Ciliax did not have any large freedom of action in selecting the route
for the movement of his group, as normally would have been the case with
an operation on the open ocean; the reasons were geography and the need to
synchronize closely the actions of the Brest Group with the support provided
by light forces and the Luftwaffe. It was especially difficult to sequence and
synchronize the employment of the Luftwaffe fighter squadrons assigned to
provide air cover for the Brest Group, but continuous and effective air cover in
the Strait of Dover area and off the coast of Belgium and the Netherlands was
critical for preventing the enemy from inflicting serious damage on the Brest
Group.
British planning for an effort to prevent the Brest Group from reaching home waters through the Channel started shortly after Scharnhorst and
Gneisenau arrived in Brest in March 1941. Plan F ULLER was based on the
correct assumption that the safest option for the enemy was to redeploy the
Brest Group to home waters through the Channel. However, both the RAF
and the Admiralty allowed themselves to become too certain that the German
ships would transit the Strait of Dover at night, and that belief was reflected in
their plans. The possibility that the Germans might transit the strait in broad
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daylight was given short shrift; hence, no alternate plans to deal with such an
eventuality were developed.
Admiral Pound was justified in his concern about employing the heavy forces
of the Home Fleet in the confined and heavily mined waters of the southern
North Sea. However, the Admiralty should have made efforts to deceive the enemy, so he at least would wonder about that possibility.
Although various major commands made relatively sound arrangements to coordinate their actions during the execution of FULLER, they were not binding. The
British also did not have the concept of supported and supporting commanders.
Prior to planning a major naval/joint operation, it is highly useful to hold a
detailed discussion of the key elements of the pending operation—what in today’s
terms is called the operational design. The soundness of the plans depends on a
realistic assessment of all essential elements of the operational situation. The naval/maritime operational commander should make a quick and sound decision
instead of waiting to get more information and make the best decision. Regardless
of advances in technologies, the commander when doing so rarely will have full
knowledge of the operational or strategic situation. Planning should be detailed so
that the commander can improvise quickly to meet unforeseen situations encountered in combat. Proper understanding of the German-style Auftragstaktik (mission command) requires that the naval/maritime operational commanders issue
only broad operational instructions, while subordinate tactical commanders issue
more-detailed operation orders. Each major naval/joint operation in the littorals is
unique because of the particular characteristics of the operating area and the need
for the closest cooperation between naval forces and those of other services.
The Germans had about four weeks in which to complete all preparations for
Operations CERBERUS and DONNERKEIL. Naval Group Command West carried
out extensive mine clearance on the pending route of the Brest Group. Modern
minesweepers were redeployed from the Baltic to the French Channel ports.
This minesweeping was accompanied by efforts to disguise it as routine activity.
Supporting security forces and destroyers were deployed to their assigned ports.
At the same time, the 3rd Air Fleet’s fighters conducted rehearsals for providing
air cover over the Brest Group. The Germans were lucky that the enemy did not
become suspicious of all their activities prior to the start of Operation CERBERUS.
Perhaps one of the most critical, and also most successful, preparatory measures
was the Luftwaffe’s jamming of the enemy coastal radar stations. The Germans
were highly successful in acclimating the enemy radar operators to the everincreasing intensity of the jamming.
The British intensified their air reconnaissance of Brest and other major ports
on the French coast over the last ten days prior to the sortie of the Brest Group.
They redeployed various air units to the airfields envisaged under Plan FULLER.
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And they increased the combat readiness of their torpedo bombers, heavy bombers, and fighters.
No plan can be executed successfully without detailed and timely preparations.
The operational commander and subordinate tactical commanders should make
sure that their plans are updated and fully nested. All forces assigned to the operation should be deployed in timely fashion, but without arousing the enemy’s suspicions. Optimally, plans should be rehearsed, and by the forces assigned to carry out
the pending operation; whenever possible, this rehearsal should be in the form of
conducting a planning game / war game. Comprehensive measures of operations
security should be conducted to prevent the enemy from receiving warning of one’s
impending actions. Experience shows that one of the best methods of preserving
secrecy is to disguise preparations as routine activities.
Despite lack of unity of command at the operational level, the Germans
executed their naval and air plans for the breakout of the Brest Group almost
flawlessly. The ships of the Brest Group executed their mission even though their
crews lacked adequate sea training because of the ships’ prolonged stay at Brest.
The performance of the ships’ leaders and crews was remarkable. Although the
actual sailing out was delayed by more than two hours, the Brest Group used high
speed, the high tide, and the following current to recover almost all the time lost
by 1000 on 12 February. The Brest Group remained undetected until it nearly
had reached the Strait of Dover. The reasons were a series of technical mishaps
with Britain’s ASV radar and the Germans’ highly successful jamming of their
opponents’ coastal radars.
The British were caught completely by surprise and were unable to employ
their naval forces and aircraft systematically. But once the enemy ships were detected the British commanders acted energetically in executing Plan FULLER. The
initial British attacks were conducted by MTBs and the FAA’s obsolete torpedo
bombers. These were followed by attacks by the destroyers. Despite the great
courage displayed by all the commanders and crews, all these attacks failed. The
British light forces clearly were inadequate to the task of successfully engaging
much larger and more-powerful enemy heavy ships, along with their screening
vessels and very strong and continuous air cover. Only the heavy ships of the
Home Fleet might have stopped the Brest Group.
Despite their employment of very large numbers of heavy bombers and torpedo bombers, the British attacks caused no damage to the enemy ships. Several
factors explain this profound lack of success. Bad weather and low visibility in
the target area compounded the problem of finding the enemy ships at all. Most
of the separate attacks were carried out by a small number of, or even individual,
bombers. Last but not least, the German fighters and the AA defense provided
by the Brest Group itself were highly effective in preventing enemy aircraft from

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol74/iss3/7

52

152

Vego:
NAVARedeployment
L WA R C O L L E G E Rof
E V Ithe
E W German Brest Group through the English Channe

scoring hits. Fighter Command provided air cover to naval forces and bombers
during their attacks on the Brest Group.
Upon detection of enemy forces, operational commanders and their subordinates
should act quickly and aggressively, boldly and creatively, or success may not follow. No
plan possibly can foresee all the enemy’s actions and reactions. In executing the plan
for a major naval/joint operation, mission command generally should be applied. The
exception is a case in which the actions of a subordinate commander could endanger
the success of the mission as a whole or the missions of adjacent commanders. Sporadic
and individual attacks generally should be avoided. The actions of supporting forces
should be synchronized fully with the actions of the main forces. However, this should
not be carried so far as to affect adversely the success of individual force elements.
Operation CERBERUS was highly successful because of sound planning and
energetic and skillful execution. Being conducted in confined and navigationally
difficult waters, it required the closest cooperation between the Brest Group and
supporting forces, particularly the Luftwaffe.
Although Operation CERBERUS took place some eighty years ago, it continues
to provide many valuable lessons for today and into the future. Especially significant are the lessons related to the human factor. Among other things, Operation
CERBERUS demonstrates the timeless importance of such factors in naval warfare
as sound command organization and the application of true mission command;
a willingness to take high but prudent risks and act with boldness, aggressiveness,
and creativity; and high-quality training and combat readiness.
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